Gregory v. Shurtleff
299 P.3d 1098, 2013 UT 18, 730 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
Utah law permits plaintiffs who lack a traditional personal injury to gain public-interest standing if they can show they are an appropriate party raising issues of significant public importance. Challenges to the structural and procedural requirements for passing legislation, such as the constitution's single-subject and clear-title rules, are issues of sufficient public importance to confer such standing.
Facts:
- In March 2008, the Utah legislature enacted Senate Bill 2 (the Bill), which contained approximately fourteen different items relating to public education.
- The Bill established new programs, amended existing ones, and included various funding provisions.
- The Bill's title was 'MINIMUM SCHOOL PROGRAM BUDGET AMENDMENTS,' but it also contained a 'LONG TITLE' that provided a general description and a bullet-pointed list of its various provisions.
- A provision of the Bill delegated administration of the Teacher Salary Supplement Program to the Department of Human Resources.
- Another provision of the Bill delegated the process for textbook approval to private entities.
- A group of current and former legislators, government officials, and citizens, including some members of the Utah State Board of Education, opposed the Bill on constitutional grounds.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellants, a group of citizens and officials, sued Appellees (state officials) in Utah district court, seeking to enjoin Senate Bill 2 as unconstitutional.
- Appellants raised four claims: two under Article VI (single-subject and clear-title rules) and two under Article X (improper delegation of authority).
- Appellees moved to dismiss the Article VI claims for failure to state a claim, which the district court granted.
- Appellees moved to dismiss the Article X claims for lack of standing or, alternatively, for summary judgment.
- The district court granted summary judgment to Appellees on the Article X claims without ruling on the issue of standing.
- Appellants appealed both the dismissal of the Article VI claims and the grant of summary judgment on the Article X claims to the Utah Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Do plaintiffs who lack a direct, personal injury have public-interest standing to challenge a law's constitutionality on the grounds that it violates the state constitution's single-subject and clear-title rules?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Durham
Yes, plaintiffs who lack a direct, personal injury have public-interest standing to challenge a law's constitutionality on these grounds. Unlike the federal system, Utah's constitution does not contain a 'case or controversy' requirement, which permits the judiciary to recognize public-interest standing. The court applies a two-part test for public-interest standing: 1) whether the plaintiff is an 'appropriate party,' and 2) whether the dispute raises an 'issue of significant public importance.' Here, the alleged violations of the single-subject and clear-title rules in Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution concern the fundamental structure of legislative power and are therefore issues of significant public importance. The Appellants are 'appropriate parties' because they have the interest and competence to litigate the claims, and it is unlikely the issues would be raised otherwise. However, the court found Appellants lacked public-interest standing for their Article X claims regarding delegation of authority, as those issues were not of the same fundamental importance. On the merits, the court held the Bill did not violate the single-subject or clear-title rules.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Lee
No, plaintiffs who lack a direct, personal injury do not have public-interest standing to bring these claims. The dissent argues that standing is a constitutional requirement rooted in the 'judicial power' clause of the Utah Constitution, not a prudential, judge-made doctrine. Historically, judicial power is limited to resolving disputes involving 'private rights' brought by parties with an individualized injury. The majority's 'public interest' test is a standardless, circular, and subjective inquiry that unconstitutionally expands judicial power and erodes the separation of powers. The dissent would repudiate the public-interest standing doctrine altogether and dismiss all of Appellants' claims for lack of standing because they assert only generalized grievances shared by all citizens.
Analysis:
This decision formally solidifies and applies Utah's two-part test for public-interest standing, drawing a clear distinction from the more restrictive federal standing doctrine. The case establishes a significant precedent by categorizing challenges to the procedural integrity of the legislative process—like single-subject and clear-title rules—as matters of sufficient public importance to warrant this exception. However, by denying standing for claims about specific agency delegations, the court signals that not all constitutional challenges will qualify, creating a hierarchy of importance. This ruling empowers citizen-led challenges against the fundamental processes of government while preserving judicial restraint for more particularized administrative disputes.
