Gregory v. City of Chicago
22 L. Ed. 2d 134, 394 U.S. 111, 1969 U.S. LEXIS 2295 (1969)
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Rule of Law:
A conviction for disorderly conduct cannot stand if it is based on conduct protected by the First Amendment or if the jury could have relied on constitutionally impermissible grounds due to vague jury instructions, even if a state appellate court later provides a narrowing construction of the ordinance.
Facts:
- Petitioners, led by Gregory, accompanied by Chicago police and an assistant city attorney, marched in a peaceful and orderly procession from city hall to the mayor’s residence.
- The purpose of the march was to press claims for desegregation of the public schools.
- Petitioners agreed to stop singing at 8:30 p.m. and did so, continuing their march in a lawful fashion.
- As the march proceeded, the number of bystanders increased, and the onlookers became unruly, shouting threats and throwing rocks and eggs at the demonstrators.
- Chicago police, believing civil disorder was imminent, demanded that the demonstrators disperse.
- When petitioners did not obey the command to disperse, they were arrested and charged with disorderly conduct.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioners were arrested by Chicago police and charged with violating the City of Chicago's disorderly conduct ordinance.
- Petitioners were convicted of disorderly conduct in a trial court.
- The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the convictions, interpreting the disorderly conduct ordinance to include a specific set of circumstances under which arrests for otherwise lawful demonstrations could be made.
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Issue:
Do convictions for disorderly conduct, stemming from a peaceful demonstration that became unruly due to hostile onlookers, violate the First Amendment and due process when the convictions may have rested on constitutionally impermissible grounds?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Warren
Yes, the convictions violate due process and the First Amendment. Petitioners' peaceful and orderly march fell within the sphere of conduct protected by the First Amendment, and there was no evidence in the record that their conduct was disorderly. Convictions so totally devoid of evidentiary support violate due process, as established in Thompson v. City of Louisville. The Court also noted that petitioners were charged and convicted for holding a demonstration, not for a refusal to obey a police officer, making it a denial of due process to convict on a charge never made. Furthermore, the trial judge’s charge permitted the jury to convict for acts clearly entitled to First Amendment protection, which, under Stromberg v. California, independently requires the reversal of these convictions because it is impossible to know whether the jury based its decision on an unconstitutional ground.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Douglas
Mr. Justice Douglas joins Mr. Justice Black’s concurring opinion and also concurs in this opinion.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice White concur in the judgment of the Court and join its opinion insofar as it holds that under the principle established by Stromberg v. California, the petitioners’ convictions cannot stand.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Black
Yes, the convictions must be reversed. This case highlights the need for a more detailed consideration of the United States' commitment to First Amendment freedoms. The Chicago disorderly conduct ordinance was a “sweeping, dragnet statute” not narrowly drawn to regulate conduct connected with speech, press, assembly, or petition. It could encompass activity specifically protected by the First Amendment and left the average person uncertain as to what conduct would lead to conviction. The only potentially illegal conduct by petitioners was their refusal to obey a policeman’s command to leave the area. Allowing a policeman's command to become equivalent to a criminal statute dangerously shifts lawmaking power from elected representatives to officers, contradicting a government of laws. While the Illinois Supreme Court later provided a narrowing construction of the ordinance, the trial judge's instructions to the jury were based on the unadorned, broad language of the ordinance. Since the jury was not instructed on the limiting factors and could have convicted petitioners simply because their protest displeased onlookers, a constitutionally impermissible ground, the Stromberg principle requires reversal.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Harlan
Yes, the convictions should be reversed. Two factors clearly call for reversal: the excessively broad and vague nature of the Chicago disorderly conduct ordinance, and the possibility that the convictions, as the case went to the jury, may have rested on a constitutionally impermissible ground, as established by Stromberg v. California. Mr. Justice Harlan agrees with Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion on these points and joins in it to that extent.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the principle that convictions cannot stand if there is a possibility that a jury relied on a constitutionally impermissible ground, particularly regarding First Amendment rights. It highlights the due process requirement that criminal statutes and jury instructions must be clear, precise, and narrowly tailored to avoid chilling protected speech and assembly. The decision also underscores the importance of a clear distinction between the actual charge and the conduct for which a person is convicted, preventing authorities from suppressing peaceful demonstrations based on the hostile reactions of onlookers or a generalized 'breach of peace' without a specific, valid, and narrowly defined offense.
