Gregg v. Rauner
2018 IL 122802, 429 Ill. Dec. 437, 124 N.E.3d 947 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
The Governor's constitutional authority to remove an appointed officer for incompetence, neglect of duty, or malfeasance is generally not subject to judicial review. A narrow exception for judicial review exists only for officers of state bodies that require a high degree of political independence to function, a standard which the Illinois Prisoner Review Board does not meet.
Facts:
- In May 2012, then-Governor Quinn nominated Eric Gregg to the Illinois Prisoner Review Board (IPRB).
- Gregg completed a statement of economic interests for calendar year 2011, stating he had received no gifts valued over $500.
- Gregg's official appointment was delayed until April 26, 2013, at which time the Governor's office filed his May 2012 statement. Gregg had received gifts in 2012, such as a medical lift chair, which were not reflected on the filed 2011 statement.
- In December 2014, Gregg filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The initial filing incorrectly indicated that he received a net monthly income of $4027 from a business, which IPRB members are prohibited from having.
- In August 2015, Gregg's bankruptcy attorney filed an amended statement attributing the business income to Gregg's wife.
- In September 2015, Governor Rauner's office sent a letter to Gregg outlining allegations related to the false bankruptcy filing and the inaccurate statement of economic interests.
- Gregg responded, explaining the bankruptcy filing was a clerical error and the economic interest statement was accurate for the year it covered (2011), despite being filed later.
- On October 2, 2015, Governor Rauner, through his General Counsel, terminated Gregg's appointment, citing the inaccuracies in the two filed documents as sufficient cause for removal.
Procedural Posture:
- Eric Gregg filed a complaint against Governor Rauner in the circuit court of Saline County, challenging his termination.
- The circuit court denied Governor Rauner's motion to dismiss, finding that the removal was subject to judicial review.
- Following a trial, the circuit court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of Gregg, ruling that his removal was wrongful.
- Governor Rauner, as appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Illinois Appellate Court.
- A divided panel of the appellate court reversed the circuit court's judgment, holding that the Governor's removal decision was not subject to judicial review.
- Gregg, as appellant, petitioned for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which the court granted.
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Issue:
Is the Governor's decision to remove a member of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board for cause, pursuant to article V, section 10 of the Illinois Constitution, subject to judicial review?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Neville
No. The Governor's decision to remove a member of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board is not subject to judicial review. The court reaffirmed the general rule from Wilcox v. People ex rel. Lipe, which holds that the Governor has the discretion to determine whether cause for removal exists, and this decision is not reviewable by the courts. The court distinguished this case from the narrow exception created in Lunding v. Walker, which permitted judicial review for the removal of a member of the State Board of Elections because that body is constitutionally mandated to be highly independent and politically neutral. The Illinois Prisoner Review Board (IPRB) does not meet this high standard for independence because it is a statutory creation, not a constitutional one; it does not require strict bipartisan balance; and its functions, such as advising on executive clemency, demonstrate that it works closely with the Governor as an executive agency, rather than needing absolute freedom from executive influence. Therefore, the general rule of nonreviewability applies.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the broad executive power of the Illinois Governor regarding the removal of appointed officials, reinforcing the principle of separation of powers. The court significantly narrows the scope of the Lunding exception, making it clear that judicial review of gubernatorial removals is reserved for only the most uniquely independent, constitutionally-mandated bodies. By classifying the IPRB as a standard executive agency rather than a quasi-judicial body requiring absolute independence, the ruling curtails the ability of most appointed officials to challenge their termination in court. This precedent establishes a high bar for any future appointee seeking judicial review of their removal, requiring them to demonstrate that their agency possesses an extraordinary level of political independence akin to the State Board of Elections.
