Greer v. Miller
483 U.S. 756 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
A single, unanswered prosecutorial question about a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence does not constitute a 'use' of that silence in violation of the Due Process Clause under Doyle v. Ohio when a trial court immediately sustains a defense objection and instructs the jury to disregard the question.
Facts:
- Neil Gorsuch was kidnapped, robbed, and murdered after leaving a bar in Jacksonville, Illinois.
- Charles Miller, Randy Williams, and Clarence Armstrong were charged with the crimes.
- At Miller's trial, Williams, an accomplice who had confessed, testified that Miller joined them and participated in shooting Gorsuch with a shotgun.
- Miller testified in his own defense, claiming he was innocent and that Williams and Armstrong had come to his trailer after the murder and confessed the crime to him.
- Following his arrest for the murder, Miller was given Miranda warnings.
- Miller exercised his right to remain silent after receiving the warnings and did not tell the police the exculpatory story he later presented at trial.
Procedural Posture:
- Charles Miller was convicted of murder, aggravated kidnaping, and robbery in an Illinois state trial court.
- Miller appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court, which reversed the conviction, finding a harmful Doyle error.
- The State of Illinois appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which reinstated the conviction, holding that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Miller filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois, which denied the petition.
- Miller appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which, sitting en banc, reversed the District Court's decision, finding a harmful Doyle violation had occurred.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Seventh Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does a single, unanswered question by a prosecutor regarding a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence, to which a defense objection is immediately sustained and followed by a curative instruction, constitute a 'use' of silence for impeachment purposes that violates the Due Process Clause under Doyle v. Ohio?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Powell
No. A single, unanswered question does not constitute a 'use' of the defendant's silence in violation of Doyle v. Ohio when the trial court sustains an objection and provides curative instructions. The Court reasoned that Doyle prohibits the government from 'using' a defendant's silence against them, which implies that the silence must be presented to the jury as evidence for its consideration. In this case, the trial judge's actions—sustaining the objection and instructing the jury to ignore the question—prevented the prosecutor from using Miller's silence. Unlike prior cases where the court permitted questioning or argument about silence, here the fact of Miller's silence was not submitted to the jury as evidence, and thus no constitutional violation occurred.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The prosecutor's question violated Doyle v. Ohio because virtually any comment that calls the jury's attention to a defendant's post-Miranda silence constitutes a prohibited 'use'. The majority improperly merges the question of whether a violation occurred with the separate analysis of whether that violation was harmless. A single comment is all that is needed to create a 'strong negative inference' in the jurors' minds that is difficult to cure with an instruction, as it strikes directly at the defendant's credibility. The Court's holding departs from settled law and 'saps Doyle of much of its vitality.'
Concurring - Justice Stevens
Yes. A Doyle violation occurred because the prosecutor's question broke the implicit promise of Miranda that silence will not be used against the defendant, and the judge's corrective actions are relevant to harmless error, not the existence of a violation. However, he concurs in the judgment because this case is on collateral (habeas corpus) review, which requires a higher standard than direct appeal. A typical Doyle error is not so fundamentally unfair as to justify overturning a final conviction on collateral attack unless it is an extraordinary case. Since this error, while real, did not make the trial fundamentally unfair, habeas relief is inappropriate.
Analysis:
This decision narrows the practical scope of what constitutes a reversible Doyle violation by focusing on the trial court's response to prosecutorial misconduct. It distinguishes between an 'attempted' violation (an improper question that is stopped) and an actual violation (where silence is 'used' as evidence). This places a greater burden on defense counsel to object immediately and seek curative instructions, as the trial court's corrective actions can prevent an improper question from ripening into a constitutional error. The ruling suggests that only when a trial court permits the use of silence does a true Doyle violation occur, shifting the legal inquiry from the prosecutor's conduct to the court's evidentiary ruling.
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