Greenwood v. Societe Francaise De
1997 WL 209531, 111 F.3d 1239 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, a shipowner has no duty to warn an expert stevedore of a defect in the ship's equipment if that defect, even if initially hidden, becomes open and obvious to the stevedore's employees upon commencing cargo operations. The duty to intervene only arises if the shipowner has actual knowledge that the stevedore's decision to continue working despite the obvious danger is 'obviously improvident.'
Facts:
- On April 1, 1986, Indian Ocean Bulk Carriers and Societe Francaise de Transportes Maritime (the Shipowners) turned over their vessel, MTV PENAVAL, to a stevedore for cargo unloading.
- C.K. Greenwood was a longshoreman employed by the stevedore to unload a cargo of pipe using the ship's cranes.
- A pre-unloading inspection report from March 20, 1986, noted that one of the slewing brakes on crane number four had been replaced with a 'not recommended' part and the other was in 'slight doubt,' but the Shipowners did not inform the stevedore of this.
- At 7:00 a.m., longshoreman Kenneth Logue began operating crane number four and immediately noticed its horizontal (slewing) motion was 'jerky' and would not stop immediately when put in neutral.
- Logue testified that he reported this defect to his gang foreman at 8:00 a.m., but no report was ever made to the Shipowners.
- A few minutes after 9:00 a.m., while Logue was operating the crane, a tag line used to guide the pipes snagged on a truck on the dock.
- Logue attempted to halt the crane's horizontal movement with the slewing brake, but he testified that it malfunctioned and failed to stop the crane.
- The tension from the continued movement caused the tag line to snap, and a swinging cargo hook struck Greenwood in the face, causing serious injury.
Procedural Posture:
- C.K. Greenwood sued the Shipowners in federal court, and the case was tried before a magistrate judge.
- At the close of Greenwood's case, the Shipowners moved for a directed verdict, arguing insufficient evidence of a breach of duty; the magistrate judge denied the motion.
- The Shipowners did not renew their motion for a directed verdict at the close of all evidence but did object to the jury instructions on the same grounds of insufficient evidence; the objection was overruled.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Greenwood, finding the Shipowners negligent.
- The magistrate judge entered a final judgment for Greenwood after reducing the damage award.
- The Shipowners then filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), which the magistrate judge also denied.
- The Shipowners, as appellants, appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, with Greenwood as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a shipowner have a duty under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act to warn a stevedore of a defect in the ship's equipment if the defect becomes open and obvious to the stevedore's employees upon beginning their work?
Opinions:
Majority - Garwood, Circuit Judge
No. A shipowner does not have a duty to warn of a defect that becomes open and obvious to the stevedore. The court analyzed the shipowner's liability under the three duties established in Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos. The first duty, the turnover duty to warn of hidden defects, did not apply because the crane operator, Logue, testified that he was aware of the slewing brake's defect as soon as he began operating it. This knowledge made the defect 'open and obvious' to the stevedore, thereby negating the shipowner's duty to warn. The third duty, the duty to intervene, was not triggered because there was no evidence that the Shipowners had actual knowledge that the stevedore's decision to continue using the crane was 'obviously improvident.' A shipowner is entitled to rely on the expert stevedore's judgment unless the danger is so extreme that anyone would recognize its continued use is an unreasonable risk.
Dissenting - Johnson, Circuit Judge
Yes. A shipowner's duty to warn of a hidden defect is not automatically negated where there is conflicting evidence about whether the defect was actually open and obvious to the stevedore. The majority improperly reweighed the evidence and usurped the jury's function as the finder of fact. There was substantial evidence contradicting the crane operator's testimony that the defect was immediately obvious, including testimony from another operator who noticed no problems and other workers who could not visually detect a defect. The jury was entitled to disbelieve the operator's testimony and instead conclude from the ship's maintenance records that a hidden defect existed. The question of whether a defect is 'hidden' or 'obvious' is a factual determination for the jury, and there was sufficient evidence to support its verdict that the defect was hidden.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the high bar for longshoremen seeking to hold shipowners liable for injuries caused by equipment defects under the 'turnover duty' established in Scindia. The court's holding emphasizes that once an expert stevedore becomes aware of a defect, the responsibility for safety shifts from the shipowner to the stevedore. This decision narrowly construes the 'duty to intervene,' requiring plaintiffs to show not only that the shipowner knew of a danger but that the stevedore's response was so clearly wrong as to be 'obviously improvident.' This strengthens the legal position of shipowners by allowing them to rely heavily on the stevedore's professional judgment.
