Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler
1970 U.S. LEXIS 42, 26 L. Ed. 2d 6, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
The First Amendment protects a newspaper's accurate and full reporting of speech at a public meeting, even if that speech includes vigorous epithets or rhetorical hyperbole. The use of a word like 'blackmail' in the context of a public debate over a political or public figure's negotiating tactics is not libelous as a matter of law.
Facts:
- Charles Bresler, a prominent real estate developer and member of the Maryland House of Delegates, was negotiating with the Greenbelt City Council to obtain zoning variances for high-density housing.
- Concurrently, the city was attempting to acquire a separate tract of land from Bresler for the construction of a new high school.
- These dual negotiations gave both parties considerable bargaining leverage and became the subject of substantial local controversy.
- Several tumultuous city council meetings were held where community members freely expressed their views on the negotiations.
- During these meetings, some citizens characterized Bresler's hard-line negotiating position as 'blackmail.'
- The Greenbelt News Review published two articles that accurately and fully reported on these public meetings, including the citizens' use of the word 'blackmail' to describe Bresler's proposal.
Procedural Posture:
- Charles Bresler sued the Greenbelt News Review for libel in a Maryland state trial court.
- The trial judge instructed the jury that it could find liability based on malice, which was defined to include 'spite, hostility or deliberate intention to harm.'
- A jury found in favor of Bresler and awarded him $5,000 in compensatory and $12,500 in punitive damages.
- The Greenbelt News Review appealed the verdict to the Maryland Court of Appeals, the state's highest court.
- The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Greenbelt News Review successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a newspaper's accurate reporting that citizens at a public meeting characterized a public figure's negotiating position as 'blackmail' constitute libel under the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Stewart
No, the imposition of liability on such a basis was constitutionally impermissible. The word 'blackmail' in these circumstances was not slander when spoken, and not libel when reported. The Court reasoned that even the most careless reader would have understood that the word was not an accusation of a criminal offense, but was instead 'rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet' used by those who considered Bresler's negotiating position extremely unreasonable. Because the newspaper was performing its legitimate function of reporting on a matter of public concern accurately and in full context, its speech was protected by the First Amendment. Additionally, the trial judge's jury instructions were erroneous for defining 'malice' to include 'spite, hostility or deliberate intention to harm,' which is an unconstitutional standard under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
Concurring - Mr. Justice White
No, the judgment should be reversed, but only on the grounds of the erroneous jury instructions. While I agree that the trial court's definition of malice was unconstitutional and requires reversal, I do not join the Court's holding that the word 'blackmail' could not be libelous as a matter of law. The Court oversteps its role by claiming 'superior insight' into how an ordinary reader in Greenbelt would understand the word. The jury was entitled to determine that the word was used and understood in its criminal sense. However, because the jury returned a general verdict and may have relied on the faulty malice instruction for other parts of the libel claim, the entire judgment must be reversed and remanded.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the distinction between a factual assertion and protected opinion or hyperbole under the First Amendment. By holding that the use of 'blackmail' in this context was non-actionable 'rhetorical hyperbole,' the Court provided greater 'breathing space' for robust and even caustic debate on public issues. The decision protects the press when it accurately reports on heated public discourse, ensuring that public figures cannot easily use libel law to silence harsh criticism. It reinforces the principle that context is crucial in determining whether a statement is a defamatory falsehood or a protected, albeit vigorous, expression of opinion.
