Green v. State
266 Ga. 758, 470 S.E.2d 884 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
An unlawful injury is the proximate cause of death if it directly and materially contributes to a secondary cause, such as medical treatment, unless an independent intervening cause not set in motion by the original injury breaks the chain of causation.
Facts:
- Bernard William Green and his wife, Cynthia Grant, were involved in a physical altercation.
- During the altercation, after Grant's daughter hit Green with a mop and Grant threw a bottle at him, Green stabbed Grant in the back with a knife.
- Grant was hospitalized for the stab wound.
- While hospitalized, she was treated with the painkiller Toradol.
- One week after the stabbing, Grant died suddenly from a bleeding stress ulcer.
- At trial, the state's pathologist testified that the stress from the stab wound caused the ulcer.
- The defense expert testified that the drug Toradol, not the stab wound, was the cause of the fatal ulcer.
Procedural Posture:
- Bernard William Green was prosecuted by the State in a trial court for the death of his wife, Cynthia Grant.
- At trial, the defense argued Green did not stab his wife and that the stab wound did not cause her death.
- The jury found Green guilty of felony murder.
- Green, as the appellant, appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective.
- The State of Georgia is the appellee.
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Issue:
Does an unlawful injury constitute the proximate cause of death when the victim dies from a secondary cause, such as a bleeding ulcer that may have been caused by medical treatment administered for the initial injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Fletcher, Presiding Justice
Yes, an unlawful injury constitutes the proximate cause of death even if a secondary medical complication is the immediate cause. The court found that the jury instructions on causation were a correct statement of the law. The instructions stated that an injury is the cause of death if it 'directly and materially contributed to the happening of a secondary or consequential cause of death,' and that a defendant is not liable if 'some intervening cause not set in motion by said wound caused the death.' The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Green's act of stabbing his wife set in motion a chain of events that resulted in her death. The hospital's treatment of the wound, including the administration of Toradol, was a foreseeable secondary cause, not an independent intervening cause that would absolve Green of criminal liability.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the principle of proximate cause in homicide law, particularly in scenarios involving medical treatment following a criminal act. It clarifies that foreseeable medical complications arising from an injury do not break the chain of causation required to hold a defendant liable for murder. The decision distinguishes a 'secondary cause,' which is part of the causal chain, from a superseding 'intervening cause,' which is an independent event that breaks the chain. This precedent makes it more difficult for defendants to escape liability by blaming medical treatment that was necessitated by their own violent acts.
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