Green v. Earnest
840 S.W.2d 119, 1992 WL 274283 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
In a will contest based on undue influence, mere opinions and beliefs of a contestant, unsupported by probative factual evidence, are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Facts:
- Cecil Ray Earnest (Cecil) lived with Judith Lisa White Earnest (Judith) since 1986, and they potentially held themselves out as husband and wife after November 1988.
- Charley Green (Charley) was an employee of Cecil's businesses from 1979 or 1980 until April 1989, when Cecil ended his employment by 'shutting down the business'.
- On May 19, 1986, Cecil executed his first will, bequeathing his entire estate equally to Judith and his two sons, Tim and Eugene.
- On December 1, 1988, Cecil executed a second will, making Charley an equal one-fourth beneficiary along with Judith and his two sons, and appointing Charley to manage his businesses and serve as a co-trustee.
- Around August 4 or 5, 1989, Cecil informed Charley via telephone that he intended to change his will to remove Charley as a beneficiary because Charley was going into business for himself, and Cecil also questioned Charley about missing business equipment.
- On August 11, 1989, Cecil executed his third will, which reverted to the same testamentary disposition as the first will, thereby eliminating Charley as a beneficiary, co-trustee, and business manager.
- Cecil died on September 16, 1989, as a result of a gunshot wound inflicted by Judith, a fact found by a jury in a separate civil suit.
Procedural Posture:
- On December 11, 1989, the August 11, 1989 will of Cecil Ray Earnest was admitted to probate.
- On May 21, 1991, Charley Green filed a lawsuit in the trial court to contest the probate of that will, alleging it resulted from undue influence by Judith Lisa White Earnest.
- Judith Lisa White Earnest (proponent) filed a motion for summary judgment.
- Charley Green (contestant) filed a response to the motion for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted Judith's motion for summary judgment, finding no material fact issues, and entered judgment that Charley take nothing.
- Charley Green (appellant) appealed the trial court's summary judgment to the Court of Appeals (appellee: Judith Lisa White Earnest).
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Issue:
Does a will contestant's evidence consisting solely of opinions and beliefs, rather than concrete, probative facts, create a genuine issue of material fact regarding undue influence sufficient to preclude summary judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - Koehler, Justice
No, a will contestant's evidence consisting solely of opinions and beliefs, rather than concrete, probative facts, does not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding undue influence sufficient to preclude summary judgment. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, noting that to defeat such a motion, the non-movant must present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on at least one element of undue influence. Undue influence requires proof of the existence and exertion of influence, its effective use to subvert or overpower the testator's mind at the time of execution, and a will that would not have been executed otherwise, as established in Rothermel v. Duncan. Charley Green's deposition testimony explicitly revealed that his claims of undue influence were based solely on his personal 'opinions and beliefs,' lacking any 'good old hard evidence' or supporting witnesses. The court found that the circumstances Charley cited, such as Judith's opportunity to influence Cecil and her alleged statements, were 'as consistent with a will executed free from improper influence as they are with a will made as a result of undue influence.' Lay witness opinions, according to Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 701 and 704, must be rationally based on perception and helpful to the issue, criteria which Charley's opinions failed to meet. The court also considered that the third will merely reverted to the same dispository scheme as Cecil's first will, which naturally allayed suspicion. Furthermore, the fact that Judith caused Cecil's death a month after the will's execution, while tragic, was not considered logically or rationally circumstantial evidence of undue influence at the precise time the will was executed. Ultimately, the evidence presented by Charley amounted to mere surmise or suspicion, which is legally insufficient to establish undue influence or create a genuine issue for trial.
Analysis:
This case establishes a stringent evidentiary standard for contestants challenging a will on grounds of undue influence, particularly at the summary judgment stage. It clarifies that subjective opinions, beliefs, or circumstances that are equally reconcilable with a freely executed will are insufficient to create a material fact issue. The decision emphasizes the necessity for specific, probative evidence—whether direct or circumstantial—that directly demonstrates the exertion and effectiveness of improper influence at the moment of the will's execution. This standard serves to prevent speculative claims from proceeding to trial, promoting efficiency in probate proceedings but also requiring meticulous factual development from any party seeking to invalidate a will due to alleged manipulation.
