Green v. Donroe
1982 Conn. LEXIS 452, 440 A.2d 973, 186 Conn. 265 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
A person is not liable for false imprisonment for providing false information to law enforcement unless the person acts for the purpose of causing a confinement or with knowledge that a confinement is substantially certain to result from the act.
Facts:
- On January 26, 1978, the defendant, Donnell, was emotionally disturbed and shot himself in the shoulder.
- To avoid the embarrassment of admitting he shot himself, Donnell called the West Haven police and falsely reported that he had been robbed and shot by a black male with a specific description.
- Based on this false description, police officers located and detained the plaintiff, Green, a black man who coincidentally matched part of the description.
- The police brought Green to Donnell, who did not identify him as the assailant.
- Green was released after being detained by the police for approximately ten minutes.
- Later, at the hospital, Donnell admitted to police that his report of a robbery was a hoax and that he had shot himself.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff, Green, filed a complaint against the defendant, Donnell, in the trial court.
- The complaint alleged two counts: false imprisonment and a violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- Following a trial to the court (a bench trial), the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants.
- The plaintiff appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.
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Issue:
Does a person who knowingly gives false information to the police, but without the intent to cause an arrest, commit the tort of false imprisonment when that information leads to the brief detention of another?
Opinions:
Majority - Shea, J.
No. A person is not liable for false imprisonment unless their act is done for the purpose of imposing a confinement or with knowledge that confinement will, to a substantial certainty, result from it. Here, the trial court found that Donnell's sole motivation for lying was his personal embarrassment, not an intent to have anyone arrested. The court reasoned that false imprisonment is an intentional tort, and liability requires either a specific purpose to cause confinement or knowledge that confinement is a 'substantial certainty.' Donnell's actions did not rise to this level, as he did not intend or expect an arrest to result from his vague, false description. The court also rejected liability on a negligence theory because the plaintiff failed to plead it, and dismissed the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim because Donnell, as a private citizen without intent to cause a deprivation of rights in concert with the police, did not act 'under color of law'.
Concurring - Parskey, J.
No. The author concurred with the majority's result but dissented from its reasoning regarding negligence. The author agreed that the plaintiff could not recover because the complaint only alleged an intentional tort (false imprisonment) and not negligence. However, the author strongly disagreed with the majority’s assertion that a negligence claim requires proof of actual damage, arguing that under established Connecticut precedent, 'every invasion of a legal right imports damage.' The author criticized the majority for relying on ancient common law distinctions between trespass and trespass on the case instead of following more recent state law, but ultimately agreed with the outcome based on the plaintiff's pleadings.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the high mens rea standard required to hold a third party liable for false imprisonment when they provide information to the police. It solidifies the rule that a mere risk or foreseeability of arrest is insufficient; the defendant must have intended the confinement or known it was a virtual certainty. The decision also serves as a critical lesson on the importance of pleading in the alternative, as the plaintiff's failure to include a negligence count precluded any potential recovery on that basis. The concurring opinion highlights an ongoing tension in tort law between traditional common law rules requiring actual damage for negligence and state-specific precedents allowing nominal damages for any invasion of a legal right.
