Greaves v. McGee

Supreme Court of Alabama
492 So. 2d 307 (1986)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

When interpreting a conveyance to determine if it grants a fee simple interest or merely a right-of-way, courts look to the entire instrument, the circumstances of its creation, and the subsequent acts of the parties to ascertain intent. A stated purpose for the land's use, such as for a road, and an uncertain property description are strong indicators that only a right-of-way was intended.

Facts:

On May 25, 1926, W.C. York acquired title to a parcel of land in Lamar County, Alabama.
On September 18, 1928, W.C. York and his wife executed an instrument conveying to Lamar County a 'strip of land twenty feet wide to be used for the purpose of constructing a road,' which the instrument also described as a 'right of way.'
The 1928 instrument allowed Lamar County to locate the road on any part of the Yorks' land, and the road's physical location was subsequently moved on several occasions.
On September 26, 1956, the Yorks conveyed their entire parcel of land to Willard P. McGee via a full warranty deed, making no exception for the strip of land used by the county.
On January 23, 1984, the Lamar County Commission executed an oil, gas, and mineral lease to Peyton Greaves for the land underlying the public road.
At the time the lease was executed, attorneys for the Lamar County Commission and the Chairman of the Commission advised Greaves that the County did not claim to own the mineral rights under the road.

Procedural Posture:

Willard McGee, Rachel McGee, and McGee, Ltd. filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment against Peyton Greaves and the Lamar County Commission in the Circuit Court of Lamar County (the trial court).
Peyton Greaves filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment establishing his right to the minerals.
The trial court found in favor of the McGees, declaring them the owners of the minerals.
Peyton Greaves (appellant) appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Alabama.

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Issue:

Does an instrument that conveys a 'strip of land...to be used for the purpose of constructing a road' and describes the conveyed interest as a 'right of way,' while also containing an indefinite and movable description of the land's location, convey a fee simple interest or merely a right-of-way?

Opinions:

Majority - Houston, J.

No. The instrument conveyed only a right-of-way to Lamar County, not a fee simple interest, and therefore the underlying mineral rights remained with the landowner. The court's primary duty is to ascertain the intent of the parties by examining the entire instrument, the surrounding circumstances, and the parties' subsequent actions. The instrument is replete with language indicating a limited purpose—the construction and maintenance of a road—which points toward an easement rather than a fee conveyance. The fact that the description of the 'strip of land' was uncertain and allowed for relocation is inconsistent with an intent to convey a specific, permanent fee interest. Furthermore, Lamar County's subsequent actions, including its admission that it only held a right-of-way and its statements to Greaves that it did not own the minerals, confirm that the original parties did not intend a fee simple transfer. The court distinguished this case from precedents like Schneider and Rowell, where the deeds more clearly conveyed 'real estate' or a 'tract of land' with the purpose being a secondary recitation, whereas here, the description clause itself characterizes the conveyance as a 'right of way.'

Analysis:

This case solidifies the principle that in property law, the grantor's overall intent, as gleaned from the entire instrument and external circumstances, trumps the technical meaning of isolated terms like 'strip of land.' The decision provides a clear framework for analyzing ambiguous conveyances made for a specific purpose, such as a road or railway. It establishes that a limited purpose and an indefinite description are strong evidence of an intent to create an easement, not a fee simple estate. This precedent is significant for protecting landowners from inadvertently conveying valuable subsurface mineral rights when they only intend to grant surface access for a public utility or thoroughfare.

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