Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Town of East Hampton
178 F.R.D. 39, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2602, 40 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1283 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
To intervene as of right, a movant must demonstrate that their interest is not adequately represented by existing parties, which is presumed when the movant shares the same ultimate objective as an existing governmental party, unless collusion, nonfeasance, adversity of interest, or incompetence is shown. Permissive intervention is discretionary and will be denied if it unduly delays or prejudices the original parties by injecting collateral issues.
Facts:
- In 1996, the Town of East Hampton adopted Local Law No. 17 of 1996, known as the 'Superstore Law,' which amended its Town Code to restrict the establishment of very large retail stores outside the Central Business zone.
- The Superstore Law specifically prohibited supermarkets from exceeding 25,000 square feet in gross floor area and required parking to be located primarily to the sides or rear of the building.
- The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc. (A & P) had proposed to develop a 33,878 square foot supermarket at a site on Montauk Highway, formerly occupied by a Stern's department store, located in a Neighborhood Business zone.
- The Superstore Law prevented A & P from proceeding with its proposed supermarket development.
- Group for the South Fork, Inc. (the 'Group') is an environmental organization dedicated to preserving the rural character, heritage, and natural resources of the South Fork of Long Island.
- The Group actively supported the Superstore Law during its passage, providing extensive testimony and commentary at public hearings.
- Members of the Group reside near the proposed A & P site and averred that the development would detrimentally alter the area's rural and residential character and adversely affect their property values.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1996, the Town of East Hampton adopted Local Law No. 17, the 'Superstore Law,' which restricted the size of retail stores.
- The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc. (A & P) filed a lawsuit in federal district court against the Town of East Hampton and the Town Board of East Hampton, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Superstore Law was invalid and unconstitutional.
- A & P's complaint alleged violations of New York and federal constitutions (due process, equal protection, interstate commerce), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and New York restraint of trade law.
- The Town moved to dismiss A & P's complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
- Group for the South Fork, Inc. moved to intervene as defendants in the action, seeking intervention either as of right under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) or permissively under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(2).
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Issue:
Does an environmental organization have a right to intervene as a defendant in a lawsuit challenging a zoning law it supported, when the defendant town shares the same ultimate objective of upholding the law and no collusion, nonfeasance, or incompetence by the town is alleged, or should it be granted permissive intervention when its broader concerns might inject collateral issues into the litigation?
Opinions:
Majority - WEXLER, District Judge
No, the Group for the South Fork, Inc. cannot intervene as of right because it failed to overcome the presumption that its interests are adequately represented by the Town of East Hampton, nor will it be granted permissive intervention due to the risk of injecting collateral issues. Regarding intervention as of right under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2), the court found that the Group met the first three requirements: a timely motion, a direct and substantial interest in the Superstore Law's validity, and that its interests would likely be impaired if the law were invalidated. However, the Group failed to satisfy the fourth requirement: demonstrating inadequate representation by existing parties. Adequate representation is presumed when a would-be intervenor shares the same ultimate objective as a party to the lawsuit, which here was the upholding of the Superstore Law. The Group did not allege collusion, nonfeasance, or incompetence by the Town. The court rejected the Group's argument that the Town's differing motives (economic growth vs. environmental protection) would lead to an inadequate defense, stating that different motives do not overcome the presumption when the ultimate legal objective is shared and the arguments are similar. Speculation about the Town potentially settling or failing to appeal was also deemed insufficient to show inadequate representation. Regarding permissive intervention under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(2), while the Group met the common question of law or fact threshold, such intervention is discretionary. The primary consideration is whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights. The court found that the Group's affidavits indicated concerns that extended beyond merely validating the Superstore Law, suggesting an intent to contest any major commercial development at the proposed A & P site. Allowing the Group to intervene would inject collateral issues, delaying and complicating the litigation to the prejudice of the plaintiff. Therefore, the Group's motion was denied, with leave to renew at a later stage if it can factually show the Town is not vigorously litigating the case.
Analysis:
This case establishes a high bar for environmental or public interest groups seeking to intervene in litigation, particularly when a governmental entity already defends the same core legal objective. It clarifies that differing underlying motives or speculative concerns about a party's litigation strategy (e.g., settlement or appeal) are generally insufficient to overcome the presumption of adequate representation for intervention as of right. Furthermore, the decision highlights judicial discretion in denying permissive intervention when an applicant's broader agenda threatens to introduce extraneous issues, underscoring the importance of judicial efficiency and focusing litigation on the primary dispute. This ruling limits the ability of such groups to become full parties if their central legal defense aligns with that of a governmental defendant.
