Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Paul
261 A.2d 731, 1970 Md. LEXIS 1202, 256 Md. 643 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
For a slander claim, the publication element is satisfied when defamatory words are communicated to any third person who understands them to refer to the plaintiff; the third person does not need to know the plaintiff personally. For false imprisonment, a shopkeeper who detains a person for suspected misdemeanor shoplifting is liable if the person is innocent, as probable cause is not a defense and the common law privilege to detain is exercised at the store's own risk.
Facts:
- John Joseph Paul, a retired police officer recovering from a recent heart condition, was shopping at an A&P supermarket.
- Paul's post-cardiac diet required him to carefully examine food labels, so he would leave his shopping cart at the end of an aisle, select an item, and return to the cart.
- John Parker, an A&P assistant manager, observed Paul's shopping method for twenty minutes and considered it unusual.
- Parker concluded, without seeing it happen, that Paul had placed a can of flea and tick spray in his coat pocket with the intent to shoplift.
- In the middle of an aisle and in front of approximately 25-30 other shoppers, Parker loudly accosted Paul, calling him a 'goddamn thief'.
- Parker then roughly frisked Paul, causing a display of cans to fall over, and grabbed his arm, forcing him to the manager's office.
- A search of Paul's person revealed no flea spray or any other stolen A&P merchandise.
Procedural Posture:
- John Joseph Paul sued The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., Inc. in a Maryland trial court for assault and battery, slander, and false imprisonment.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of Paul.
- The trial court entered a judgment against A&P, awarding Paul $10,000 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in punitive damages.
- The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., Inc., as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does the element of 'publication' in a slander claim require proof that the third persons who heard the defamatory statement personally knew the defamed individual?
Opinions:
Majority - Digges, J.
No, the element of publication in a slander claim does not require that the third-party hearers personally knew the plaintiff. The court rejected A&P's argument that slander requires a stricter standard of publication than libel, finding no legal support for the proposition that the third party must know the defamed person. Publication is satisfied as long as the defamatory matter is communicated to a third person who understands it to refer to the plaintiff as an 'ascertained or ascertainable person.' In this case, Paul was clearly the ascertainable person being accused, and the jury could reasonably infer from the loud, public nature of the confrontation that nearby shoppers overheard the accusation. The court also affirmed the false imprisonment verdict, holding that in Maryland, a private person (like a shopkeeper) cannot arrest for a misdemeanor like petit larceny unless it constitutes a breach of the peace. The common law privilege to detain a person to recapture property is exercised at the shopkeeper's peril; if the person is found to be innocent, the detention constitutes false imprisonment, and probable cause is not a defense to liability.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies two important principles in Maryland tort law. First, it clarifies that the 'publication' element of slander does not hinge on the audience's personal familiarity with the plaintiff, focusing instead on whether third parties overheard the statement and understood to whom it referred. This prevents defendants from escaping liability for public accusations made before strangers. Second, the court strongly reaffirms its traditional, strict approach to false imprisonment by shopkeepers, declining to judicially adopt the more merchant-friendly 'shopkeeper's privilege' based on reasonable belief. By leaving the law unchanged after the legislature failed to properly enact such a privilege, the court places the risk of mistake in detaining suspected shoplifters squarely on the merchant, prioritizing individual liberty over property protection in cases of error.
