Grayned v. Rockford

Supreme Court of United States
408 U.S. 104 (1972)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A government may enact narrowly tailored time, place, and manner restrictions on expressive activity adjacent to a school during school hours, provided the ordinance is not vague or overbroad and only prohibits conduct that materially disrupts, or is about to disrupt, normal school activities.

Facts:

Negro students at West Senior High School in Rockford, Illinois presented a list of grievances to school administrators.
After the school principal took no action on their complaints, students and supporters planned a public demonstration.
On April 25, 1969, approximately 200 people, including Richard Grayned whose siblings attended the school, gathered on a public sidewalk about 100 feet from the school building while school was in session.
Demonstrators marched with signs demanding things such as "Black cheerleaders to cheer too" and "Black history with black teachers."
Testimony at trial regarding the demonstration's nature was contradictory; government witnesses claimed the protestors were loud and disruptive, while defense witnesses claimed they were quiet and orderly.
After warning the demonstrators, police arrested 40 participants, including Grayned.

Procedural Posture:

Richard Grayned was tried and convicted in a Rockford, Illinois trial court for violating the city's 'antipicketing' ordinance and 'antinoise' ordinance.
Grayned appealed his convictions directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois, mounting a facial challenge to the constitutionality of both ordinances.
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that both ordinances were constitutional on their face, affirming Grayned's convictions.
Grayned appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which noted probable jurisdiction to review the case.

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Issue:

Does a city ordinance that prohibits any person on grounds adjacent to a school in session from willfully making a noise or diversion that disturbs or tends to disturb the peace of the school session violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments for being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Marshall

No. The ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. A city ordinance prohibiting willful noises or diversions that disturb or are about to disturb the normal activities of a school in session is a permissible time, place, and manner regulation under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On the vagueness challenge, the ordinance provides fair warning because it applies at a specific time and place and prohibits conduct measured by an objective standard: whether it is incompatible with normal school activity. The phrase 'tends to disturb' is construed, based on state court precedent, to mean an imminent or actual disturbance, not a mere tendency. On the overbreadth challenge, the ordinance is constitutional because the government has a compelling interest in maintaining an undisrupted educational environment. Applying the standard from Tinker v. Des Moines, expressive activity near a school may be prohibited if it 'materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder.' This ordinance is narrowly tailored to that interest, punishing only disruptive conduct without banning peaceful, non-disruptive protest.

Dissenting in part - Justice Douglas

Yes. While agreeing that the separate anti-picketing ordinance was unconstitutional, Justice Douglas would have also reversed the conviction under the anti-noise ordinance. He argued that the ordinance was unconstitutionally applied to punish activity protected by the First Amendment. In his view, the record showed the demonstrators were quiet and orderly, and the primary noise came from police loudspeakers. Therefore, the ordinance was used to suppress peaceful protest on a preeminent public issue—racial discrimination—which is the very kind of expression the First Amendment is meant to protect.

Analysis:

This case is significant for extending the 'material and substantial disruption' standard from Tinker v. Des Moines, which governed student speech inside a school, to public protests on sidewalks adjacent to a school. It solidifies the principle that the 'special characteristics of the school environment' justify reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on First Amendment activities that would be permissible elsewhere. The decision provides a framework for municipalities to protect schools from disruption while affirming that sidewalks near schools remain public forums where peaceful, non-disruptive protest is constitutionally protected.

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