Gray v. Gray
947 So.2d 1045 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
Under Alabama's pretermitted child statute, the exception found in § 43-8-91(a)(2) will be strictly construed according to its plain language. A child born after the execution of a will is not entitled to an intestate share if, at the time the will was executed, the testator had one or more children and devised substantially all of their estate to the after-born child's other parent, even if the preexisting children were from a different marriage.
Facts:
- In 1981, John Merrill Gray II executed a will while married to his second wife, Mary Rose Gray.
- At the time, John had two children from a prior marriage, Robert B. Gray and Monica L. Muncher.
- John's 1981 will devised his entire estate to Mary and made no provision for his two existing children.
- In 1984, John and Mary gave birth to a son, John Merrill “Jack” Gray III.
- In 1989, John and Mary divorced.
- The divorce settlement included a provision creating a trust for Jack, to be funded by one-half of any inheritance John received from his own mother's estate.
- In 2004, John died without having revised his 1981 will.
Procedural Posture:
- William Terry Gray, the executor of John Gray's estate, petitioned the Jefferson County Probate Court to probate John's will.
- John Merrill 'Jack' Gray III petitioned the probate court for an order finding him entitled to an intestate share of the estate under the pretermitted child statute.
- The executor and John's other children moved to dismiss Jack's petition.
- The probate court granted Jack's petition, holding that he was entitled to a share of the estate.
- The executor, William Terry Gray, appealed the probate court's order to the Supreme Court of Alabama.
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Issue:
Does the exception in Alabama's pretermitted child statute, § 43-8-91(a)(2), apply to prevent a child born after the execution of a will from receiving an intestate share when the testator already had children from a previous marriage at the time of execution and devised his entire estate to the after-born child's mother?
Opinions:
Majority - Not specified, but joined by Nabers, C.J., and Harwood, Woodall, Stuart, and Smith, JJ.
Yes, the exception in § 43-8-91(a)(2) applies and prevents the after-born child from receiving an intestate share. The statute is unambiguous and must be strictly construed according to its plain meaning. The exception sets forth two clear conditions: (1) the testator had one or more children when the will was executed, and (2) the testator devised substantially all of the estate to the other parent of the omitted child. Both conditions are met in this case: John had two children in 1981, and his will devised his entire estate to Mary, who is Jack's mother. The statute does not invite judicial inquiry into the testator's intent for this specific exception, unlike other subsections. The fact that John's other children were from a prior marriage is immaterial under the statute's plain text, and the court will not rewrite the statute to achieve a different result.
Dissenting - Lyons, J., joined by Bolin and Parker, JJ.
No, the exception in § 43-8-91(a)(2) should not apply in this situation. A literal interpretation of the statute leads to an absurd result that the legislature could not have intended. The rational basis for the exception is to assume a testator is providing for their children indirectly by giving the entire estate to their shared parent. This logic fails when the preexisting children are from a different relationship. The statute should be read in context, meaning the reference to 'one or more children' should be restricted to children of the testator and the devisee spouse. To do otherwise ignores the statutory purpose of preventing unintentional disinheritance and leads to an unreasonable and unjust outcome.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the Alabama Supreme Court's commitment to the plain meaning rule in statutory interpretation, especially for statutes in derogation of common law like the pretermitted child statute. It establishes that courts will not look beyond the clear text to infer legislative intent or to correct for seemingly inequitable outcomes in complex family scenarios. The ruling places a significant onus on testators to regularly update their estate plans following major life events, such as the birth of a child, as they cannot rely on judicial intervention to protect children omitted from outdated wills if the statutory exceptions are technically met.
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