Gray v. Break
1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 21856, 440 So. 2d 1297 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
A directed verdict is improper if there is any evidence from which a jury could reasonably find the defendant's actions proximately caused the injury, and a party cannot claim reversible error regarding the admission of evidence if their own counsel initially introduced that evidence.
Facts:
- On November 8, 1977, David William Gray, Jr. was operating a motorcycle and Edward M. Break was operating an automobile on State Road 424.
- A group of pedestrians, including Stephen Dart, Shawn D. Clark, Robb S. Gooch, Karen Leanne Miller, and Susan Hutchison Caldwell, were crossing State Road 424 in a 'jaywalking' manner.
- Break's automobile stopped in the driving lane, allegedly abruptly, to allow the pedestrians to cross.
- Gray, Jr.'s motorcycle collided with the rear of Break's automobile.
- Testimony conflicted on whether the pedestrians had crossed the double yellow line dividing the lanes, the abruptness of Break's stop, and whether 'No Jaywalking' signs were present.
- One pedestrian admitted being charged with and pleading guilty to a jaywalking charge.
Procedural Posture:
- David William Gray, Jr. and his parents (plaintiffs) filed an action in the trial court (court of first instance) for personal injury and property damage against Edward M. Break (automobile operator) and his insurance carrier, and several pedestrians (Stephen Dart, Shawn D. Clark, Robb S. Gooch, Karen Leanne Miller, Susan Hutchison Caldwell) and their respective insurance carriers (defendants).
- At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the pedestrian defendants and their insurance carriers.
- The trial court submitted the case to the jury solely on the issues between the plaintiffs and defendant Break.
- The jury returned a defense verdict for Break.
- The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of all defendants (pedestrians, their carriers, Break, and his carrier).
- The Grays (plaintiffs below) appealed the judgment to the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
1. Does evidence that pedestrians were 'jaywalking' and caused an automobile to stop abruptly provide a sufficient basis for a jury to find their actions contributed to the proximate cause of an accident, making a directed verdict for the pedestrians improper? 2. Can a party appeal the admission of allegedly prejudicial insurance evidence if that party's own counsel initially introduced the evidence during trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
1. Yes, the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict for the pedestrians because there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to reasonably find that the pedestrians' actions contributed to the proximate cause of the accident. Upon consideration of a motion for directed verdict, the plaintiff is entitled to the resolution of all inconsistencies in the evidence in their favor. The evidence, though disputed, regarding the pedestrians' 'jaywalking' (potentially violating Section 316.130, Florida Statutes) and the impact of their conduct on Break's stopping, was ample to submit the issue of proximate cause to the jury. 2. No, the plaintiffs cannot successfully appeal the revelation of Gray's insurance carrier paying for Break's car damage because their own counsel initially injected the irrelevant insurance issue into the trial. While it was error for the trial court to allow defense counsel to reopen this matter on cross-examination, the error was deemed harmless under Section 59.041, Florida Statutes. Under the 'invited error' doctrine, an appellant cannot base a reversal on an error their own counsel invited.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the high standard for granting a directed verdict in negligence actions, emphasizing that a jury's role in resolving conflicting evidence regarding proximate causation should be preserved unless there is no reasonable basis for a finding. It also serves as a crucial reminder for trial attorneys about the 'invited error' doctrine, which prevents parties from appealing a perceived error if their own actions introduced the objectionable material. The application of the harmless error statute highlights that judicial errors, even if improper, do not warrant reversal unless they result in a 'miscarriage of justice' and were not invited.
