Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp.
591 A.2d 671, 248 N.J. Super. 446 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
A medical expert's opinion on causation is admissible in a toxic tort case even if based in part on epidemiological studies showing a relative risk factor below 2.0, provided the expert combines those studies with other evidence specific to the plaintiff, such as clinical findings and the elimination of other potential causes.
Facts:
- From 1951 to 1966, William Gasko was employed by Goetze Gasket, a division of Johns-Manville.
- His job involved cutting asbestos sheets and rolls manufactured by defendants The Celotex Corporation and GAF Corporation.
- The work environment contained constant asbestos dust, which Gasko inhaled and ingested, as employees ate lunch in the same room where they worked.
- In October 1974, Gasko was diagnosed with colon cancer and had a section of his large intestine removed.
- There has been no recurrence of the cancer since the 1974 surgery.
- Gasko's medical history showed he never smoked, did not drink alcohol, and his mother's cancer was of the 'women's organs,' not colon cancer.
Procedural Posture:
- William Gasko and Marie Gasko sued The Celotex Corporation and GAF Corporation, among others, in a New Jersey trial court for injuries related to asbestos exposure.
- A jury at the first trial returned a verdict for the Gaskos, awarding $500,000 to Mr. Gasko and $200,000 to Mrs. Gasko.
- Defendants moved for a new trial or, alternatively, for remittitur, arguing the verdict was excessive.
- The trial judge found the damages excessive and ordered a remittitur to $200,000 for Mr. Gasko and $20,000 for Mrs. Gasko, or, if rejected, a new trial on all issues.
- The Gaskos rejected the remittitur, and the court ordered a new trial.
- Prior to the new trial, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs' proof of medical causation was legally insufficient.
- The trial judge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, barring the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert and dismissing the complaint.
- The Gaskos (plaintiffs-appellants) appealed the summary judgment order to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
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Issue:
Is a qualified medical expert's opinion on causation admissible when it relies in part on epidemiological studies showing a relative risk factor of less than 2.0, in conjunction with other clinical evidence specific to the patient?
Opinions:
Majority - Dreier, J.A.D.
Yes, a qualified medical expert's opinion on causation is admissible even if it relies in part on epidemiological studies with a relative risk factor below 2.0. The court rejected a rigid threshold for admissibility, finding it arbitrary to exclude an expert's opinion simply because a statistical study does not show a doubling of the risk (a 2.0 factor). The court reasoned that an expert physician does not rely solely on epidemiological data but integrates it with clinical findings and patient-specific information, such as ruling out other known risk factors. Under Evidence Rule 56(2), an expert may rely on data reasonably used by others in their field, and the weight and credibility of that opinion are matters for the jury to determine after rigorous cross-examination. Furthermore, the plaintiff's burden is not to prove that the defendant's product was the sole cause of the injury, but that it was a 'substantial factor' in bringing it about.
Analysis:
This decision significantly impacts toxic tort litigation by rejecting a bright-line quantitative rule for the admissibility of expert testimony based on epidemiological evidence. By allowing experts to synthesize studies with risk factors below 2.0 with patient-specific clinical data, the court makes it easier for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment and present their causation arguments to a jury. This approach shifts the focus from a simple numerical threshold to a more holistic evaluation of the expert's entire methodology. Consequently, the battle over causation is more likely to be fought before the jury through cross-examination, rather than being decided by a judge as a matter of law at a preliminary stage.
