Grant v. Stop-N-Go Market of Texas, Inc.
994 S.W.2d 867 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
A store's statutory shopkeeper's privilege to detain a suspected thief is limited to false imprisonment claims and does not shield it from liability for defamation. Further, a genuine issue of material fact for false imprisonment exists where a customer is detained through threats or fear of injury to their reputation, and the reasonableness of the detention's manner and duration is typically a question for a jury.
Facts:
- Gerald Grant entered a Stop-N-Go store and had a verbal dispute with the clerk over the price of potato chips.
- Grant placed a one-dollar bill on the counter for the chips.
- Concerned for his girlfriend in a car parked outside, Grant walked to the store's front door, picking up his dollar bill from the counter on his way.
- After determining his girlfriend was safe, Grant returned to the counter, paid for the chips, and made a critical comment to the clerk.
- As Grant attempted to exit the store, the manager, Gerald Calhoun, grabbed his arm, pulled him back, and loudly accused him of stealing cigarettes in front of other patrons.
- Calhoun told Grant he was calling the police.
- Grant remained at the store out of fear that if he left, police would come looking for him.
- The police arrived and took Grant to the station; he was ultimately detained for over an hour before being released when the allegations were found to be unsubstantiated.
Procedural Posture:
- Gerald Grant sued Stop-N-Go Market of Texas, Inc. in a Texas trial court for false imprisonment and defamation.
- Stop-N-Go moved for summary judgment on both claims.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Stop-N-Go.
- Grant, as the appellant, appealed the summary judgment to the Court of Appeals of Texas, First District, an intermediate appellate court. Stop-N-Go is the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a genuine issue of material fact exist for claims of false imprisonment and defamation when a store manager physically stops a customer, publicly accuses him of theft, and calls the police, thereby precluding summary judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - Michol O’Connor
Yes. A genuine issue of material fact exists for both the false imprisonment and defamation claims, making summary judgment improper. Willful detention for a false imprisonment claim does not require physical restraint and can be accomplished through threats that inspire a just fear of injury to one's reputation, such as being labeled a fugitive. Here, a factual dispute exists as to whether Grant was told he could not leave and whether his fear of leaving was reasonable after the manager called the police. Furthermore, the shopkeeper's privilege requires the detention to be for a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, both of which are disputed facts for a jury to decide, especially as the detention lasted over an hour. For the defamation claim, the statutory shopkeeper's privilege does not apply, and the common law qualified privilege was lost when the manager made the accusation publicly in front of other patrons rather than limiting the communication to those with a common interest in the matter.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the boundaries of the shopkeeper's privilege in Texas, reinforcing that the reasonableness of a detention is almost always a question of fact for a jury, which makes it more difficult for defendants to win such cases on summary judgment. The court's holding explicitly separates the statutory privilege for false imprisonment from the common law qualified privilege for defamation, establishing that the former cannot be used as a defense against the latter. This distinction is significant for future cases, as it means shopkeepers can be held liable for defamatory statements made during a detention even if the detention itself is found to be privileged. The ruling underscores that the manner of an accusation (public versus private) is critical in determining whether a defamation privilege is lost.
