Grant v. State
357 Ark. 91, 2004 Ark. LEXIS 279, 161 S.W.3d 785 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
The sense of imminent death required for a dying declaration to be admissible under the hearsay exception does not need to be shown by the declarant's express words alone, but can be supplied by inferences fairly drawn from their grave physical condition and awareness of their severe injuries.
Facts:
- On June 20, 2001, Abraham Grant entered an apartment in Helena, Arkansas, belonging to his mother-in-law, Ms. Rosetta Pittman.
- Upon entering the apartment through the open front door, Grant began shooting at the occupants, striking Ms. Pittman in her hand, chest, and neck, and her niece, Louise Perry, in the hand.
- The first officer on the scene, Captain David Lovell, found Ms. Pittman lying in a large puddle of blood at the back door, upset, crying, with blood coming from her mouth, and passing in and out of consciousness.
- Captain Lovell managed to calm Ms. Pittman, and she told him, 'Abraham Grant shot me, and he ran out the back door.'
- Ms. Pittman communicated to Captain Lovell that she knew she had lost a lot of blood and was 'in real bad shape,' but she did not explicitly state that she knew she was dying.
Procedural Posture:
- Abraham Grant was charged with capital murder and first-degree battery.
- Grant filed a motion in Phillips County Circuit Court (the trial court) to exclude statements made by Ms. Pittman as inadmissible hearsay.
- The Phillips County Circuit Court held a pretrial hearing where Officer Lovell testified, and the court subsequently determined that Ms. Pittman’s statement qualified as a dying declaration and was admissible.
- A Phillips County jury found Grant guilty of capital murder and first-degree battery, sentencing him to life in prison without parole for capital murder and five years for first-degree battery, with sentences to run concurrently.
- Grant appealed the trial court's decision to the Arkansas Supreme Court, contending that the trial court erred in admitting Ms. Pittman’s statements under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule (Grant is the appellant, the State is the appellee).
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Issue:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting a victim's statement as a dying declaration when the victim did not explicitly state a belief of imminent death, but her grave physical condition and awareness of severe injury allowed for such an inference?
Opinions:
Majority - Betty C. Dickey, Chief Justice
No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Ms. Pittman's statement as a dying declaration. The court affirms the trial court's ruling, reiterating that a sense of imminent death for the dying declaration exception (Ark. R. Evid. 804(b)(2)) does not solely require the declarant's express words, but can be inferred from their condition. The court found that Ms. Pittman's circumstances—being shot multiple times, lying in a large puddle of blood, sobbing, passing in and out of consciousness, and her awareness of being 'in real bad shape'—provided sufficient grounds for the trial court to conclude she believed her death was imminent. This approach is consistent with prior rulings, such as Boone v. State, which held that the sense of imminent death can be supplied by inferences fairly drawn from the declarant's condition, and Hammon v. State, which supports the inherent trustworthiness of dying declarations.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the breadth of the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule, allowing for circumstantial evidence to establish a declarant's belief of imminent death. It underscores the significant discretion afforded to trial courts in evidentiary matters, particularly when assessing a declarant's state of mind based on their physical condition. The decision ensures that critical statements from severely injured victims, who may be unable to articulate their belief of impending death, are not automatically excluded, thereby preserving potentially vital evidence in criminal prosecutions. This case will likely serve as a precedent for inferring a declarant's state of mind in similar grave injury scenarios.
