Graham ex rel. Graham v. Independent School District No. I-89
1994 WL 136393, 22 F.3d 991 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
A public school district does not have an affirmative constitutional duty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect students from violence by private third parties, as compulsory school attendance laws do not create a custodial relationship akin to incarceration or institutionalization.
Facts:
- Charles William Graham, Jr. was a student at a school operated by Independent School District No. I-89.
- School employees received warnings that another student, who had previously threatened Charles, was on school grounds with a gun.
- Following these warnings, the other student shot and killed Charles while he was at school.
- In a separate incident, Benjamin P. Pointer was a student at a school operated by Western Heights Independent School District.
- The school district allegedly knew or should have known that Benjamin was in danger from another student.
- Benjamin was stabbed by the other student while on school premises.
Procedural Posture:
- Ladonna J. Graham sued Independent School District No. I-89 in U.S. District Court, alleging a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- Paula Pointer filed a similar § 1983 lawsuit against Western Heights Independent School District in U.S. District Court.
- In both cases, the defendant school districts filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
- The district court granted the defendants' motions and dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional claims.
- The plaintiffs (appellants) in both cases appealed the dismissals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a public school district have an affirmative constitutional duty under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to protect a student from an attack by another student, even when the school is aware of a specific threat of violence?
Opinions:
Majority - Moore, J.
No. A public school district does not have an affirmative constitutional duty under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to protect students from attacks by other students. The court reasoned that the Due Process Clause generally does not require the state to protect citizens from harm inflicted by private actors. Citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., the court explained that an exception to this rule exists only when the state takes a person into its custody and holds them against their will, creating a 'special relationship.' Relying on its own precedent in Maldonado v. Josey, the court held that compulsory school attendance does not create such a custodial relationship because students are not restrained in the same manner as prisoners or institutionalized individuals. The court also rejected the argument that the school's knowledge of a specific threat created a duty, stating that foreseeability alone is insufficient without a custodial relationship. Finally, the court dismissed the 'state-created danger' theory, concluding that the school districts took no affirmative action that created or increased the danger to the victims; simply enrolling students together does not meet this standard.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the high bar for holding public schools liable under § 1983 for student-on-student violence. By affirming that compulsory attendance does not create a 'special relationship,' the court makes it exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to establish a constitutional duty to protect. The ruling emphasizes that the state's failure to act, even when aware of a specific danger, does not trigger Due Process protections in a non-custodial setting. This precedent forces future plaintiffs in similar situations to demonstrate an affirmative act by the school that created or enhanced the danger, a much higher standard than merely alleging a failure to intervene.
