Gragg v. Calandra
297 Ill. App.3d 639, 231 Ill. Dec. 711, 696 N.E.2d 1282 (1998)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A hospital may be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of apparent authority for an intentional tort, such as medical battery, committed by its apparent agents. A claim for medical battery, which focuses on the absence of patient consent to a touching, is distinct from medical malpractice and does not require a health professional report.
Facts:
- On December 28, 1992, Florian Quintola went to the emergency room at Hinsdale Hospital with his daughter, Geraldine Gragg, and his wife, Ann Guintola.
- Defendant doctors, whom Geraldine and Ann believed to be agents of Hinsdale Hospital, examined Florian.
- Ann Guintola signed a consent form for certain cardiac tests, including an angiogram.
- During a cardiac catheterization performed by defendant Dr. Malhotra, Florian suffered cardiac arrest and became unconscious and nonresponsive.
- Following Florian's cardiac arrest, defendant Dr. Calandra and another physician proceeded to perform open heart bypass surgery on Florian without first obtaining consent from his family.
- Florian sustained irreversible brain damage, remained nonresponsive, and could not survive without life support.
- Florian had a living will stating his wish to withhold extraordinary measures to sustain life.
- Geraldine Gragg and Ann Guintola repeatedly asked defendants to remove Florian from life support to honor his wishes, but Hinsdale Hospital and its doctors refused to honor the living will.
- Florian Quintola never regained consciousness and died on January 5, 1993.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff Geraldine Gragg, individually and as special administrator of Ann Guintola's estate, filed a third amended complaint against Hinsdale Hospital, Dr. David Calandra, and Dr. Rabindra Malhotra in the trial court of Du Page County.
- The complaint included Count I (under the Rights of Married Persons Act for hospital expenses), Count II (under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act), and Counts III and IV (for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
- Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss various counts of the complaint under sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- The trial court dismissed Count I of the third amended complaint in favor of Hinsdale Hospital with prejudice.
- The trial court dismissed Counts II through IV of the third amended complaint in favor of Hinsdale Hospital and physicians Calandra and Malhotra with prejudice.
- The trial court entered a finding under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) that there was no just cause for delay of enforcement or appeal regarding the dismissed counts.
- Count I against the defendant physicians (Calandra and Malhotra) remained pending in the trial court.
- Plaintiff timely appealed the trial court's dismissal of Counts I, II, III, and IV to the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
1. Does a hospital have a duty to obtain consent for medical procedures performed by its apparent agents, thereby rendering it vicariously liable for medical battery when such procedures are performed without consent, and does such a claim require a health professional report? 2. Did the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the hospital and physicians?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Inglis
Yes, a hospital can be held vicariously liable for medical battery performed by its apparent agents without consent, and such a claim does not require a health professional report. The court held that Geraldine Gragg, in her individual capacity, lacked standing under the Family Expense Act because only a spouse may maintain such an action; however, her claim as special administrator of Ann Guintola's estate for expenses survived Ann's death, as it represented a property right rather than an action solely dependent on a statute lacking a survival provision. The court found that the allegations of performing surgery and continuing life support without consent constituted medical battery, an intentional tort, not medical malpractice. Therefore, a section 2-622 health professional report, required for malpractice claims, was unnecessary. The court extended the doctrine of apparent authority, previously applied to negligence, to intentional torts, reasoning that patients rely on the hospital's overall reputation and perceive physicians practicing there as agents. The plaintiff adequately pleaded apparent agency by alleging that the physicians were apparent agents and led the family to believe they were agents of Hinsdale. No, the complaint failed to state a claim for relief under the Consumer Fraud Act. The plaintiff did not sufficiently specify how advertisements were false or deceptive, or how they proximately caused any damages. The allegations did not set forth specific facts demonstrating a deceptive act or misrepresentation by defendants with the intent that the plaintiff rely upon them, nor a connection between the representations and the alleged injury. Yes, the allegations were sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the hospital and physicians. The court found that the conduct of repeatedly accusing Geraldine and Ann of trying to kill Florian, continuing life support against wishes, and refusing to honor the living will, knowing their severe emotional distress, could be considered extreme and outrageous by a jury. The defendants knew or should have known of the plaintiffs' peculiar susceptibility to emotional distress due and conscious disregard of that probability. The court reiterated that even a legitimate objective does not permit outrageous means. As intentional torts, these claims also did not require a section 2-622 report, but punitive damages are not recoverable for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Illinois.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the distinction between medical battery and medical malpractice in Illinois, establishing that a claim based on lack of consent for medical procedures sounds in battery and does not necessitate a health professional's report. Crucially, it extends the doctrine of apparent authority, typically applied to negligence, to cover intentional torts committed by a hospital's apparent agents, broadening the scope of hospital vicarious liability. Furthermore, it provides important guidance on what constitutes 'extreme and outrageous' conduct in the context of healthcare, particularly when defendants are aware of a plaintiff's emotional vulnerability, impacting how medical professionals and institutions must approach end-of-life decisions and family interactions.
