Grady v. Corbin
495 U.S. 508 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted.
Facts:
- On October 3, 1987, Thomas Corbin drove his car across the double yellow line of a highway in LaGrange, New York.
- Corbin's vehicle struck two oncoming vehicles, causing serious injuries to Brenda Dirago and her husband, Daniel Dirago.
- Later that evening, Brenda Dirago died from the injuries sustained in the accident.
- While being treated at the hospital, Corbin was served with two traffic tickets: one for the misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated (DWI) and one for failing to keep right of the median.
- A blood test revealed Corbin's blood alcohol level was 0.19%, nearly twice the legal limit in New York.
- On October 27, 1987, Corbin pleaded guilty to the two traffic offenses in the LaGrange Town Justice Court.
- At the time of the plea and subsequent sentencing, the presiding judge and the assistant district attorneys involved were unaware that the accident had resulted in a fatality.
Procedural Posture:
- Thomas Corbin pleaded guilty to two traffic tickets (DWI and failing to keep right of the median) in the LaGrange Town Justice Court, a court of first instance.
- Two months later, a grand jury indicted Corbin on charges of reckless manslaughter, vehicular manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and reckless assault.
- Corbin moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds in Dutchess County Court, which was denied.
- Corbin then sought a writ of prohibition from the Appellate Division, an intermediate appellate court, to bar the prosecution; the petition was denied.
- Corbin appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, which reversed the lower courts and held that the subsequent prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
- The State of New York (represented by Grady, the District Attorney), the petitioner, successfully sought a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court to review the decision of the New York Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar a subsequent prosecution for homicide and assault where the government's bill of particulars indicates it will prove the defendant's conduct of driving while intoxicated and failing to keep right of the median, offenses for which the defendant has already been convicted?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
Yes. The Double Jeopardy Clause bars this successive prosecution because the government, to establish essential elements of the homicide and assault charges, will prove conduct that constitutes offenses for which the defendant has already been prosecuted. The traditional Blockburger test, which compares the statutory elements of offenses, is not the exclusive standard for successive prosecutions. The Clause also protects individuals from the harassment and ordeal of being forced to defend against the same conduct in multiple trials. Here, the state's bill of particulars explicitly states it will rely on proving Corbin's intoxicated driving and failure to keep right—the very conduct for which he was convicted—to prove the recklessness and negligence elements of the homicide and assault charges. The critical inquiry is the conduct the state will prove, not merely the evidence it will use or the statutory elements of the crimes.
Dissenting - Justice O'Connor
No. The majority's new rule is inconsistent with the Court's recent holding in Dowling v. United States, which permitted the introduction of evidence of a crime for which the defendant had been acquitted in a subsequent trial for an unrelated offense. The Court's decision today effectively nullifies Dowling in many circumstances and casts doubt on the validity of established evidence rules, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which allows evidence of other crimes to prove elements like identity or intent. The reasoning in Dowling correctly delineated the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the Court's departure from it is improper.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
No. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against being twice put in jeopardy for the same 'offense,' not for the same 'conduct.' The established, textually sound, and historically correct test for determining the 'same offense' is the Blockburger 'same elements' test. The majority abandons this clear precedent in favor of a new 'same conduct' test derived from non-binding dictum in a prior case. This new rule is practically unworkable for trial courts, lacks a basis in the Constitution's text or history, and will effectively require prosecutors to join all charges from a single transaction, a rule the Court has repeatedly rejected.
Analysis:
This case established the 'Grady test' or the 'same conduct' test, which added a second, more protective layer to the double jeopardy analysis for successive prosecutions. It moved beyond the purely statutory Blockburger 'same elements' test to consider the actual conduct the prosecution would prove in the second trial. This decision significantly broadened the scope of double jeopardy protection, but its complex and often confusing application led to its eventual reversal just three years later in United States v. Dixon (1993). For students, this case is a critical example of a major, albeit temporary, doctrinal shift in double jeopardy jurisprudence.
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