Government of the Virgin Islands v. Alan Archibald
28 V.I. 228, 987 F.2d 180 (1993)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Evidence of a defendant's prior crimes or wrongful acts is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) when offered to prove a person's character in order to show action in conformity therewith, particularly when the purported non-propensity purpose, such as proving identity, is not a material issue in dispute. Such evidence must also be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 if its danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.
Facts:
- Alan Archibald was the boyfriend of Tasha Chinnery and had fathered a child with her when she was approximately 14 years old.
- Tasha's younger sister, ten-year-old Latoya Chinnery, lived with her aunt, Marlene Chinnery.
- Archibald, Tasha, Latoya, and their mother, Ursula Williams, were neighbors and had known each other for years.
- Latoya Chinnery alleged that on three separate occasions beginning in October 1991, Archibald would come to her window at night, she would let him in, and they would engage in sexual intercourse.
- Marlene Chinnery discovered a screen removed from Latoya's bedroom window, stones on the floor, a curtain rod outside, and stains on Latoya's bedspread.
- After being confronted by her mother, Ursula Williams, Latoya disclosed the sexual encounters with Archibald.
- A medical examination of Latoya revealed a torn hymen and evidence of several past penetrations, but the examining doctor did not specifically implicate Archibald.
Procedural Posture:
- Alan Archibald was charged with three counts of aggravated rape in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.
- At trial, the government elicited testimony from the victim's mother that Archibald had previously fathered a child with the victim's minor sister.
- Defense counsel objected to the testimony as improper character evidence under Rule 404(b) and as unduly prejudicial under Rule 403.
- The trial court overruled the objection but provided a limiting instruction to the jury.
- The jury convicted Archibald on all three counts.
- Archibald (appellant) appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and the Government (appellee) responded.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the admission of evidence of a defendant's prior statutory rape of the victim's sister, offered for the purported purpose of establishing witness identification, violate Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 when the defendant's identity is not a genuinely disputed issue in the case?
Opinions:
Majority - Cowen, Circuit Judge
Yes, the admission of the evidence violates Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403. Evidence of prior crimes is inadmissible to prove a defendant's propensity to commit the charged offense, and here, the evidence was not probative of any material issue other than Archibald's character. The government's claim that the evidence was needed to prove the witnesses' ability to identify Archibald fails because identity was never a material issue in dispute; Archibald was a well-known neighbor and his defense was that the victim fabricated the story, not that she misidentified her attacker. Furthermore, even if the evidence had minimal relevance, it should have been excluded under Rule 403 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The evidence created a 'guilt by reputation' scenario, suggesting to the jury that Archibald had a propensity for intercourse with underage sisters, which was highly prejudicial in a case that otherwise rested almost entirely on the young victim's testimony. The court also held that the admission of hearsay testimony on redirect examination was a separate, reversible error because the defense counsel's cross-examination did not 'open the door' to its introduction.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the critical gatekeeping function of Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403, preventing the prosecution from introducing inflammatory character evidence under a weak pretext. It clarifies that a 'permissible purpose' under 404(b), such as proving identity, must relate to a matter that is genuinely in dispute. The ruling serves as a strong reminder for trial courts to conduct and articulate a rigorous balancing test under Rule 403, weighing the actual need for the evidence against its potential for severe prejudice. The case establishes that in a factually close case, the improper admission of highly prejudicial prior act evidence is unlikely to be considered harmless error.
