Gouin v. Gouin
249 F. Supp. 2d 62, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3438, 2003 WL 1071667 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Massachusetts law, the alleged conduct, viewed in its totality, must be more than mere insults, annoyances, or tortious acts; it must be so extreme and outrageous as to be utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
Facts:
- Francois Gouin, Jr. ('Gouin') and Dori C. Gouin ('Dori') jointly owned a condominium as tenants by the entirety.
- On November 7, 1999, during a dispute over their son, Gouin allegedly threatened Dori, stating, 'You can either do it my way or I can beat you half to death...'
- With Dori's approval, Todd D. Posey ('Posey') began living in the condominium on December 10, 2000.
- On January 3, 2001, Posey discovered that someone had changed the condominium's locks, preventing him from entering.
- The following day, January 4, 2001, Dori regained access and changed the locks again. She obtained a temporary restraining order against Gouin, but it was not served on him before the subsequent events.
- On January 5, 2001, Gouin attempted to gain entry into the condominium by drilling through the lock. Posey, who was inside, opened the door.
- Gouin then allegedly demanded Posey leave within ten minutes, waved a handheld tape recorder in Posey's face 'in a menacing manner,' and muttered angrily.
- During the arrest that followed this incident, Gouin secretly used the handheld device to record the arresting officers, McMahon and Toner.
Procedural Posture:
- Francois Gouin, Jr. ('Gouin') filed a civil complaint against Dori C. Gouin ('Dori'), Todd D. Posey ('Posey'), William R. Toner ('Toner'), Edward McMahon ('McMahon'), and others in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
- The defendants filed various motions to dismiss Gouin's complaint.
- The court granted the motions in part and denied them in part, dismissing certain defendants and claims.
- Defendants Dori, Posey, Toner, and McMahon subsequently filed answers and counterclaims against Gouin.
- Gouin filed motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss all counterclaims filed against him.
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Issue:
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), does a series of acts, including attempting to enter one's own property, demanding an occupant leave, waving a tape recorder, and filing a criminal complaint, collectively constitute conduct so 'extreme and outrageous' as to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Massachusetts law?
Opinions:
Majority - Magistrate Judge Collings
No. The alleged conduct, viewed in totality, does not rise to the level of 'extreme and outrageous' required to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Massachusetts law. The court analyzed the four instances of conduct alleged by Posey: 1) Gouin's attempt to enter his own condo, which, given the unserved restraining order, was at most an annoyance; 2) Gouin's demand that Posey leave; 3) waving a tape recorder, which is an annoyance or at worst tortious behavior; and 4) filing a criminal complaint that was later dismissed. The court reasoned that neither individually nor collectively do these actions meet the high threshold of being 'beyond all possible bounds of decency' and 'utterly intolerable in a civilized community' as required by established case law. The court contrasted this with other claims, such as those for assault, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution, which were found to be sufficiently pleaded to survive the motion to dismiss because the allegations met the specific elements for those torts.
Analysis:
This case provides a clear judicial application of the high threshold for pleading intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). It reinforces that the 'extreme and outrageous' element is a significant legal hurdle, distinguishing truly atrocious behavior from conduct that is merely insulting, annoying, or even independently tortious or criminal. The decision serves as an important gatekeeping example under Rule 12(b)(6), preventing claims based on aggravating but not socially intolerable conduct from proceeding. For students, it illustrates the necessity of matching specific factual allegations to each element of a cause of action, as shown by the dismissal of the IIED claim while other tort claims based on the same underlying events were allowed to proceed.
