Gore v. Ark. Teachers Fed. Credit Union
568 S.W.3d 761, 2019 Ark. 75 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
When a court order grants an "additional" period of time for service of process, that period begins to run from the expiration of the previous service period, not from the date the extension order is entered, unless the order specifies otherwise.
Facts:
- Arkansas Teachers Federal Credit Union (ATFCU) initiated a legal action against Ryan Gore.
- ATFCU was unable to locate Gore to serve him with the complaint and summons within the initial 120-day period allowed by law.
- Before the initial period expired, ATFCU sought and received a court order granting it 'an additional 120 days' to perfect service.
- As the first extension period neared its end, ATFCU, still unable to locate Gore, sought and received a second court order granting 'an additional 120 days' for service.
- ATFCU ultimately effectuated service on Gore by publishing a warning order in the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette on March 8, 2017.
Procedural Posture:
- ATFCU filed a complaint in replevin against Gore in Arkansas circuit court.
- ATFCU filed a motion for an extension of time to serve Gore, which the circuit court granted.
- ATFCU later filed a second motion for extension, which the circuit court also granted.
- Gore filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that service was not completed within the required time.
- The circuit court held a hearing and subsequently denied Gore's motion to dismiss.
- ATFCU then moved for a default judgment because Gore had not filed an answer to the complaint, which the circuit court granted.
- Gore appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss and the entry of the default judgment to the state's highest court.
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Issue:
When a court grants a motion for 'an additional 120 days' to complete service of process, does the new 120-day period begin to run from the date the extension order is entered or from the expiration date of the previous service period?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice John Dan Kemp
No. A court order granting 'an additional 120 days' for service extends the time by tacking the new period onto the end of the previous deadline, rather than starting a new clock from the date the order is entered. The court reasoned that the determinative factor is the intention of the court, gathered from the order and the record. The use of the word 'additional' suggests that the time is granted in addition to the period already allowed. Neither extension order stated that the 120 days began to run from the date of the order's entry. The court calculated that the initial 120-day period ended on July 12, 2016; the first extension ran until November 9, 2016; and the second extension ran until March 9, 2017. Therefore, service via warning order on March 8, 2017, was timely, and the resulting default judgment was valid.
Analysis:
This decision provides a crucial clarification for calculating deadlines under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i) regarding extensions for service of process. It establishes a default interpretation that the term 'additional' means the new time period is consecutive to the expiring one, promoting predictability for litigants. The ruling also implicitly encourages trial courts to draft more precise extension orders, specifying the exact start and end dates, to prevent similar interpretive disputes. By focusing on the court's intent and the plain meaning of 'additional,' the case reinforces standard principles of interpreting judicial orders while ensuring that diligent plaintiffs are not penalized for ambiguous wording when they have shown good cause for extensions.
