Morris W. Gordon v. United States of America
383 F.2d 936 (1967)
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Rule of Law:
A trial judge has the discretion to exclude evidence of a defendant's prior convictions for impeachment if their prejudicial effect on the jury far outweighs their probative value as to the defendant's credibility. To guide this discretion, the court should consider factors including the nature of the prior crime, its remoteness, its similarity to the charged offense, and the importance of the defendant's testimony.
Facts:
- Gordon was charged with robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon.
- The case presented a direct conflict in evidence, turning entirely on the credibility contest between the complaining witness and Gordon.
- The complaining witness had a prior conviction for larceny.
- Gordon had prior convictions for crimes including robbery and carrying a dangerous weapon.
- At his trial, the prosecution sought to introduce Gordon's prior convictions to impeach his credibility after he testified in his own defense.
Procedural Posture:
- Gordon was convicted of robbery and assault in a jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
- On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to consider granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence of the complaining witness's own criminal record.
- The District Court granted Gordon a new trial.
- At the second trial, the judge allowed the prosecution to use Gordon's prior convictions to impeach his testimony.
- A jury convicted Gordon for a second time.
- Gordon (Appellant) appealed his second conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, arguing the trial judge improperly admitted evidence of his prior convictions.
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Issue:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion by admitting a defendant's prior criminal convictions for impeachment purposes without weighing their probative value as to credibility against their potential prejudicial effect on the jury?
Opinions:
Majority - Burger, Circuit Judge
No. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the defendant's prior convictions for impeachment. While a trial court has discretion to exclude such evidence, the burden is on the defendant to present sufficient reasons for withholding past convictions from the jury. Here, the defendant did not properly invoke the court's discretion, and furthermore, because the case narrowed to a contest of credibility between the accused and his accuser, there was a compelling reason to explore all information that could help the jury determine who to believe. The court clarified the standard from Luck v. United States, establishing that to exclude a prior conviction, a judge must find that its prejudicial effect 'far outweighs' its probative value for credibility. The court then outlined several factors to guide this balancing test: the nature of the crime (dishonesty vs. violence), its remoteness in time, its similarity to the charged offense, and the importance of the jury hearing the defendant's testimony.
Analysis:
This case is significant for providing a concrete, multi-factor framework for trial judges to apply when exercising their discretion to admit or exclude a defendant's prior convictions for impeachment. While the prior case of Luck v. United States established this discretion, Gordon provides the practical guidelines—often called the 'Gordon factors'—that became highly influential in evidence law. This decision moves beyond a simple statutory rule, requiring a nuanced, on-the-record balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect, and it heavily influenced the subsequent codification of Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a).
