Gordon v. Frost
388 S.E.2d 362, 193 Ga. App. 517 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
Conduct may be found to be sufficiently extreme and outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress when there is a special relationship between the parties and the actor has knowledge that the other person is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress.
Facts:
- Gail Gordon, a customer of Treasury Drug for over four years, was familiar with pharmacists Frost and Benton and suffered from migraine headaches.
- On March 17, 1986, while suffering from a migraine, Mrs. Gordon called the pharmacy to renew a prescription for Fiorinal #3 with Codeine.
- She spoke to an intern pharmacist, providing her name, the doctor's name, and the medication name, but did not have the doctor's DEA number.
- Mrs. Gordon told the intern and then pharmacist Frost to call her doctor's office to get the number, but never claimed she was calling from the doctor's office.
- Frost, who had previously called Mrs. Gordon a "hypochondriac," called the doctor's office and learned no one from the office had authorized the prescription.
- Without attempting to contact Mrs. Gordon to clarify the situation or checking the pharmacy's computer for her prescription history, Frost concluded Mrs. Gordon was attempting fraud.
- Frost reported her suspicion to the DEA and, following their instructions, had Mrs. Gordon detained when she arrived at the pharmacy.
- A police officer arrested Mrs. Gordon at the pharmacy in front of another customer; Frost signed a "Citizen's Arrest Form" to facilitate the prosecution.
Procedural Posture:
- Mr. and Mrs. Gordon sued Thrift Drug Company, pharmacist Frost, and manager Benton in the trial court for intentional infliction of emotional distress and other claims.
- During the trial, the judge granted a directed verdict in favor of Benton on all counts, and in favor of the other defendants on the false imprisonment and negligence counts.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of the Gordons on their claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium, awarding them damages.
- Defendants Frost and Thrift Drug Company filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motion for JNOV, thereby setting aside the jury's verdict, but denied the motion for a new trial.
- The Gordons, as appellants, appealed the trial court's grant of the JNOV to the intermediate court of appeals. Frost and Thrift Drug, as appellees, filed a cross-appeal on the denial of their motion for a new trial.
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Issue:
Does a pharmacist's conduct of suspecting a long-time customer of prescription fraud, causing her to be arrested without a thorough investigation, and acting with knowledge of the customer's medical history rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct required for intentional infliction of emotional distress?
Opinions:
Majority - Beasley, Judge.
Yes, a jury could reasonably find that the pharmacist's conduct constitutes intentional infliction of emotional distress. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct so terrifying or insulting as to naturally humiliate, embarrass, or frighten the plaintiff. In this case, the existence of a special relationship of professional trust between pharmacist Frost and customer Gordon is a critical factor. Frost's knowledge of Gordon's extensive medical history and her perception of Gordon as a "hypochondriac" put Frost on notice that Gordon was peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress. Given this context, Frost's limited investigation before reporting Gordon to the DEA, and her subsequent actions during and after the arrest, could be interpreted by a jury as evidence of malicious purpose or wanton disregard for Gordon's rights, thus meeting the high standard for outrageous conduct.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the 'outrageous conduct' element for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), particularly within the context of special relationships like that between a pharmacist and a customer. It establishes that a defendant's knowledge of a plaintiff's particular vulnerability can significantly lower the threshold for what a jury may consider outrageous. The case reinforces the principle that when reasonable people could differ on whether conduct is outrageous, the determination is a question of fact for the jury, not a question of law for the judge. This precedent strengthens IIED claims for plaintiffs who are harmed by professionals in positions of trust who act recklessly based on incomplete information.
