Goodlett v. Kalishek
223 F.3d 32 (2000)
Rule of Law:
Under New York law, the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk bars negligence claims for injuries resulting from risks inherent in a sport or recreational activity, including risks that flow directly from participation and occur immediately after the activity formally concludes.
Facts:
- Richard Lee Goodlett and Christopher Kalishek participated in a Formula V air race involving modified single-seat airplanes flying at speeds of 100 to 200 mph at low altitudes.
- The racing association explicitly warned pilots that mid-air collisions were the 'greatest fear' in the sport and usually resulted in fatalities.
- Goodlett was an experienced pilot and the President of the racing association that issued these warnings.
- Goodlett finished the race in second place, crossing the finish line slightly ahead of Kalishek.
- Approximately 14 seconds after crossing the finish line, while both planes were still traveling at race speeds (30 to 50 feet above ground), Goodlett and Kalishek entered a left turn.
- The two airplanes collided in mid-air during the turn.
- The collision caused both planes to crash, resulting in Goodlett's death and serious injuries to Kalishek.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff (Goodlett's wife) sued Kalishek for wrongful death based on negligence in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
- Kalishek moved for judgment as a matter of law based on primary assumption of risk.
- The District Court denied the motion, ruling the doctrine did not apply post-race, and submitted the case to the jury.
- The jury returned a verdict finding Goodlett 60% at fault and Kalishek 40% at fault.
- The District Court entered judgment against Kalishek for damages.
- Kalishek appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the New York doctrine of primary assumption of the risk bar a plaintiff's wrongful death claim when a mid-air collision between race pilots occurs approximately 14 seconds after crossing the finish line, while the pilots are still flying at race speeds?
Opinions:
Majority - José A. Cabranes
Yes, the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk bars the claim because the risk of collision flowed directly from participation in the sport. The court reasoned that under New York law, specifically Turcotte v. Fell and Morgan v. State, a participant in a sport consents to those injury-causing events that are known, apparent, or reasonably foreseeable consequences of participation. This consent negates the defendant's duty of care, meaning they can only be held liable for reckless or intentional conduct, not mere negligence. The court determined that air racing is inherently dangerous and Goodlett was fully aware of the risks. The court rejected the argument that the doctrine did not apply because the race had technically finished. Since the pilots were still flying in tight formation at race speeds of 100 to 200 mph only 14 seconds after the finish, the risk of collision was a risk that 'flowed' from participation in the sport.
Dissenting - Wilfred Feinberg
No, the court should not have decided this issue as a matter of law without consulting the state court. Judge Feinberg argued that the distinction between risks 'during the race' and 'post-race' is significant and unsettled under New York law. He noted that once the competition ends, the adverse relationship between competitors ceases, and different expectations regarding safety might apply, as suggested by the District Court judge. Because there is no controlling precedent regarding assumption of risk in the immediate post-competition phase, the dissent argued the question should have been certified to the New York Court of Appeals to prevent a potential misinterpretation of state law.
Analysis:
This case significantly expands the temporal scope of the 'primary assumption of the risk' doctrine in New York. By holding that the doctrine applies to accidents occurring immediately after the finish line, the Second Circuit established that the legal definition of 'participation' in a sport includes the immediate cool-down or cessation period if the inherent risks of the activity (such as speed and proximity) remain present. This prevents plaintiffs from using technicalities regarding the precise end-time of a sporting event to reinstate a duty of care that was otherwise negated by their participation. It reinforces that 'inherency' of the risk is the deciding factor, rather than the strict procedural boundaries of the game.
