Gooding v. Wilson

Supreme Court of United States
405 U.S. 518 (1972)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A state statute that criminalizes the use of 'opprobrious words or abusive language' is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under the First and Fourteenth Amendments if it has not been authoritatively construed by the state's courts to apply only to 'fighting words,' which are words that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.

Facts:

On August 18, 1966, Johnny C. Wilson was part of a group picketing an Army headquarters building to protest the war in Vietnam.
The protestors blocked the building's doorway to prevent military inductees from entering.
When police officers attempted to remove the protestors from the doorway, a scuffle ensued.
During the scuffle, Wilson said to police officer M.G. Redding, 'White son of a bitch, I’ll kill you.' and 'You son of a bitch, I’ll choke you to death.'
Wilson also said to police officer T.L. Raborn, 'You son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on me again, I’ll cut you all to pieces.'

Procedural Posture:

Johnny C. Wilson was convicted in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia (a state trial court) on two counts of using opprobrious and abusive language.
Wilson appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia (the state's highest court), which affirmed his conviction, rejecting his argument that the statute was unconstitutional.
Wilson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
The District Court held that the Georgia statute was facially unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad and set aside Wilson's conviction.
The State of Georgia, as the appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, with Wilson as the appellee.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment.
The State of Georgia then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

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Issue:

Does a state statute criminalizing the use of 'opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace' violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments on its face if state courts have not limited its application to only 'fighting words'?

Opinions:

Majority - Mr. Justice Brennan

Yes. The Georgia statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it is facially overbroad and has not been narrowly construed to apply only to unprotected speech. While states may constitutionally punish 'fighting words' as defined in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, this power requires a narrowly drawn statute or an authoritative judicial construction that limits the statute's application to words that 'have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed.' An examination of Georgia appellate decisions reveals that the statute has been applied to speech that does not meet this standard, such as language that is merely insulting or that might lead to a breach of the peace at some future time. By not limiting the statute's scope to words that incite an immediate breach of the peace, and instead relying on a 'common understanding and practice' standard, the statute is susceptible to improper application against constitutionally protected expression and thus has a chilling effect on speech.

Dissenting - Mr. Chief Justice Burger

No. The Georgia statute does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court makes a mechanical and insensitive application of the overbreadth doctrine by invalidating the statute based on a few old, isolated state cases rather than its plain language. The statute's text, which prohibits 'opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace' used 'to or of another, and in his presence,' is clearly and narrowly aimed at the kind of face-to-face 'fighting words' that Chaplinsky held to be unprotected. Wilson's own conduct was clearly unprotected, and he should not be permitted to overturn his conviction by hypothesizing how the statute might be applied to others. The Court's decision disregards the statute's valid purpose of preventing personal, abusive, and insulting language likely to provoke a violent retaliation.

Dissenting - Mr. Justice Blackmun

No. The Georgia statute is constitutional, and the Court's decision is incomprehensible. Wilson's words were clearly 'fighting words,' and common sense dictates that the concise and clear language of the Georgia statute covers such conduct. The Court invalidates the statute by relying on antiquated state court decisions from decades ago, effectively penalizing the state because its courts have not had an opportunity to conform to the Supreme Court's 'modern theories of overbreadth.' This decision pays mere lip service to the 'fighting words' doctrine established in Chaplinsky and demonstrates that the overbreadth doctrine itself is flawed and in need of re-examination. The result leaves the state powerless to proscribe genuinely harmful, bullying conduct.

Analysis:

This case solidifies the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine, establishing that a statute regulating speech can be struck down on its face if it is susceptible to being applied to protected speech. The Court's decision emphasizes that it is not enough for the statute's language to appear to target unprotected 'fighting words'; state courts must have authoritatively and consistently construed the law to apply only to that narrow category. This ruling places a significant burden on legislatures to draft speech-regulating statutes with extreme precision or on state courts to issue narrowing constructions, as the mere potential for chilling protected expression is sufficient for a statute to be invalidated, even against a defendant whose own speech was clearly unprotected.

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