Good News Club v. Milford Central School
533 U.S. 98, 121 S. Ct. 2093, 150 L. Ed. 2d 151 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
A public school that establishes a limited public forum cannot exclude a private organization's speech based on its religious viewpoint if the subject matter is otherwise permissible within the forum. Such exclusion constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, and allowing access under these circumstances does not violate the Establishment Clause.
Facts:
- Milford Central School's community use policy allowed district residents to use its facilities after school for several purposes, including 'instruction in any branch of education, learning or the arts' and 'social, civic and recreational meetings'.
- The policy expressly prohibited the use of school premises 'for religious purposes'.
- Stephen and Darleen Fournier, sponsors of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children ages 6 to 12, submitted a request to hold the Club's weekly meetings in the school cafeteria.
- The Club's meetings were described as involving taking attendance, reciting Bible verses for treats, singing songs, playing games involving Bible verses, hearing a Bible story and its application, and closing with prayer.
- Milford's superintendent formally denied the request, concluding that the Club's proposed activities were 'the equivalent of religious worship' and 'religious instruction', and therefore barred by the policy.
- After reviewing materials from the Club, the Milford Board of Education adopted a resolution officially rejecting the Club's request to use its facilities 'for the purpose of conducting religious instruction and Bible study'.
Procedural Posture:
- The Good News Club filed suit against Milford Central School in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York.
- The District Court granted a preliminary injunction, allowing the Club to meet, but later vacated it and granted summary judgment in favor of Milford.
- The District Court held that Milford's restriction was constitutional subject discrimination, not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
- The Good News Club, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- A divided panel of the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment, with Milford as appellee.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the issue.
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Issue:
Does a public school's policy of excluding a private Christian club for children from meeting on school property after hours, based on the club's religious nature and activities, constitute unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Thomas
Yes, the school's policy of excluding the Good News Club constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Milford created a limited public forum open to the teaching of morals and character development but excluded the Good News Club from discussing that same subject simply because it did so from a religious viewpoint. Citing the precedents of Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger, the Court found no meaningful distinction between teaching morals through secular means (like Aesop's Fables) and teaching them through religious instruction, prayer, and Bible stories. Furthermore, Milford's Establishment Clause defense fails; allowing the Club equal access is an act of neutrality, not endorsement. The after-school, non-sponsored nature of the meetings, combined with the requirement of parental consent, negates any risk of coercion or perceived state endorsement of religion.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
Yes. This exclusion is blatant viewpoint discrimination. The school permits secular groups to not only discuss moral values but also to defend the underlying premises of those values. However, it forbids the Good News Club from defending the religious premise on which its moral views are based. He also argued that in the context of private speech in a limited public forum, concerns over perceived endorsement and coercive peer pressure are not relevant to the Establishment Clause analysis.
Concurring - Justice Breyer
Yes. While agreeing that summary judgment for the school was improper, he wrote to emphasize that a child's perception of school endorsement of religion is a critical factor in Establishment Clause cases. He argued that the Court could not fully answer this question on the current record and that the case should be remanded for further factual development on how a reasonable child participant would understand the school's role.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
No. A public school can reasonably distinguish between speech from a religious viewpoint, which is permissible, and speech aimed at religious proselytizing or inculcation, which can be excluded from a limited public forum. He argued that the Good News Club's activities fall into the latter category of religious recruitment, which school officials may reasonably believe introduces divisiveness and undermines the school's educational mission. Therefore, excluding the Club was a permissible subject-matter distinction, not viewpoint discrimination.
Dissenting - Justice Souter
No. The majority misapplied Lamb's Chapel because the Good News Club's activity is not merely a discussion of a secular subject from a religious viewpoint; it is 'an evangelical service of worship.' This constitutes a distinct subject matter ('religious purposes') that Milford's unchallenged policy permissibly excluded. Furthermore, the majority erred by deciding the Establishment Clause issue, which was not addressed by the lower courts and for which the factual record is insufficient, particularly given the impressionability of the young elementary school-aged audience.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies and expands upon the principles from Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger, making it significantly more difficult for government entities to exclude religious speech from limited public forums. The Court's reasoning blurs the line between 'speech about a subject from a religious viewpoint' and 'religious worship or instruction,' treating them as functionally equivalent for viewpoint discrimination purposes. This ruling provides religious groups with stronger legal footing to demand equal access to public facilities that are open to other community groups, while narrowing the government's ability to use the Establishment Clause as a justification for exclusion.
