Gonzales v. State
1976 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 856, 532 S.W.2d 343 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
The offense of 'attempted involuntary manslaughter' does not exist because a criminal attempt requires a specific intent to commit an offense, which is logically incompatible with the reckless mental state required for involuntary manslaughter.
Facts:
- On the night of August 25, 1974, Solomon Gonzales, Jr. entered the living quarters of Paul Chavez, Sr., whom he had known for about eleven years.
- Gonzales pulled out a pistol, was told to put it away, and then did so.
- When Chavez, Sr. asked if the gun was real, Gonzales responded, “No, look,” and as Chavez, Sr. turned to hang up a telephone, Gonzales shot Chavez's five-year-old son, Paul Chavez, Jr., in the head.
- After firing the weapon, Gonzales stated, “when I do something like this, I have to leave,” and fled the building.
- Later that evening, Gonzales was arrested outside a club after waving the same pistol and confronting another person.
- Gonzales testified that he had been drinking heavily before the incident, could not remember it, and had a history of epilepsy.
Procedural Posture:
- Solomon Gonzales, Jr. was charged with attempted murder in a Texas trial court.
- A jury found Gonzales guilty of attempted murder.
- The jury assessed an enhanced punishment of seventy-five years.
- Gonzales appealed his conviction to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which is the state's highest court for criminal cases.
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Issue:
Does the offense of 'attempted involuntary manslaughter' exist under a penal code that defines criminal attempt as requiring specific intent and defines involuntary manslaughter as a reckless act?
Opinions:
Majority - Douglas, J.
No, the offense of 'attempted involuntary manslaughter' does not exist. The court reasoned that under the Texas Penal Code, a criminal attempt requires a 'specific intent to commit an offense.' In contrast, involuntary manslaughter is defined by a reckless act, which negates any specific intent to kill. The court concluded that it is a logical contradiction to specifically intend to commit an unintentional (i.e., reckless) act. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on a non-existent offense. The court also found the evidence sufficient to show Gonzales had the intent for attempted murder, as a jury could reasonably conclude that he was aware that shooting a person in the head would almost certainly result in death.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a crucial principle in the law of inchoate crimes by establishing that an attempt charge cannot be based on an underlying offense that requires a mens rea of only recklessness or negligence. It clarifies that the specific intent required for attempt liability must apply to the result of the crime, not just the conduct. This precedent prevents defendants from seeking lesser-included offense instructions for non-existent 'attempted reckless' crimes, thereby streamlining prosecutions and jury instructions for cases involving attempted homicide.
