Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J. B.
2017 WL 764080, 797 S.E.2d 87, 300 Ga. 840 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
An intervening criminal act by a third party breaks the chain of proximate causation and insulates a defendant from liability for negligence unless the defendant had reasonable grounds to foresee that the specific criminal act was a probable consequence of their conduct.
Facts:
- J. B. was a patient at the dental practice Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC (GGS) for an outpatient procedure.
- GGS hired certified registered nurse anesthetist (CRNA) Paul Serdula as an independent contractor through a staffing agency that had performed a credentialing process on him.
- On September 16, 2009, Serdula administered anesthesia to J. B., keeping her heavily sedated for approximately two hours.
- At some point during the procedure, J. B. was left alone with Serdula.
- While J. B. was sedated and alone with him, Serdula sexually molested her and made three brief video recordings of the assault.
- Prior to this event, GGS had no knowledge of any information in Serdula’s record that indicated he might harm a patient.
- Serdula's crimes were discovered after his hidden cell phone was found recording employees in a GGS office restroom, which led to the discovery of the videos of J. B. and other patients.
Procedural Posture:
- J. B. filed suit against GGS and Paul Serdula in a Georgia trial court.
- J. B. later withdrew her claims against Serdula after he pled guilty to criminal charges.
- The case against GGS proceeded to a jury trial, where the jury returned a verdict in favor of J. B.
- The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict.
- GGS, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Georgia Court of Appeals.
- A divided Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Supreme Court of Georgia granted GGS's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a third party's intervening criminal sexual assault break the chain of causation, thereby relieving a dental practice of liability for its alleged negligence, when the practice had no prior knowledge of the third party's criminal tendencies?
Opinions:
Majority - Hines, Chief Justice
Yes, a third party's intervening criminal act breaks the chain of causation under these circumstances. For a defendant's negligence to be the proximate cause of an injury, the intervening criminal act must be a probable and foreseeable consequence, not merely a possible one. Here, Serdula’s criminal sexual assault was not a foreseeable consequence of any alleged negligence by GGS, such as improper supervision or over-sedation. GGS had no knowledge of Serdula's criminal tendencies, and general awareness within the dental profession that such assaults can occur does not make this specific act foreseeable. The court also held that GGS was not liable for negligence per se for violating an anesthesia permit statute because that law was intended to prevent medical complications from anesthesia, not to guard against criminal sexual assaults. Therefore, Serdula’s criminal act was an intervening cause that superseded any alleged negligence by GGS, relieving the practice of liability.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the significant hurdle of proximate cause when an unforeseeable, intervening criminal act occurs. It clarifies that general, industry-wide knowledge of a potential risk is insufficient to establish foreseeability for a specific defendant; there must be evidence that the defendant knew or should have known of the particular perpetrator's dangerous tendencies. The ruling strengthens the intervening act defense for businesses and healthcare providers, limiting their liability for the criminal acts of third parties unless specific prior knowledge can be demonstrated. Additionally, the court's narrow interpretation of the negligence per se doctrine emphasizes that a statute's purpose is key to determining whether its violation can be the basis for liability for a specific harm.
