Goldman v. United States
316 U.S. 129 (1942)
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Rule of Law:
The use of electronic surveillance equipment, such as a detectaphone, to overhear conversations within a private office does not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, provided there is no physical trespass or entry into the constitutionally protected area.
Facts:
- Martin Goldman and other lawyers (petitioners) proposed a fraudulent bankruptcy scheme to Hoffman, an attorney representing an assignee.
- Hoffman refused the proposal, but the petitioners persisted.
- Hoffman then pretended to agree to the scheme while secretly cooperating with federal investigators.
- Federal agents gained access to petitioner Shulman's office at night and installed a listening apparatus in the partition wall, but this device failed to work.
- The next day, agents entered an adjoining office, not belonging to the petitioners, and used a different device called a detectaphone.
- The agents placed the detectaphone's receiver against the partition wall separating the two offices.
- Using the detectaphone, the agents successfully overheard and transcribed incriminating conversations between the petitioners and Hoffman taking place inside Shulman's office.
- The agents also overheard Shulman's side of several telephone conversations he made from his office.
Procedural Posture:
- Goldman, Shulman, and another were indicted in federal district court for conspiracy to violate the Bankruptcy Act.
- Prior to trial, the petitioners filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained via the detectaphone.
- The trial court held a preliminary hearing and denied the motion to suppress.
- The petitioners were convicted at trial after the evidence was admitted over their objections.
- The petitioners appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
- The Supreme Court of the United States granted the petitioners' writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the use of a detectaphone, placed against the wall of a private office to overhear conversations within, constitute an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Roberts
No. The use of a detectaphone placed against an outer wall to overhear conversations within a room does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court adheres to its precedent in Olmstead v. United States, which held that a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment requires a physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area. Since the agents did not physically enter Shulman's office to gather the evidence, no trespass occurred, and therefore no search or seizure was conducted. The Court found no meaningful distinction between wiretapping telephone lines from outside a premises (as in Olmstead) and placing a listening device against a wall. The Court also held that overhearing one side of a telephone conversation from within the room where it originates does not constitute an "interception" prohibited by the Federal Communications Act, as the act protects the means of communication during transmission, not the secrecy of the conversation itself before it enters the wires.
Concurring - Chief Justice Stone and Justice Frankfurter
The concurring justices stated that had a majority of the Court been willing to overrule Olmstead v. United States, they would have joined them. However, since the majority declined to do so and this case is indistinguishable from Olmstead, they felt bound by that precedent and concurred in the judgment.
Dissenting - Justice Murphy
Yes. The use of a detectaphone to listen to private conversations inside an office is an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The dissent argued that the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted flexibly to protect the right to privacy against modern technological intrusions. Justice Murphy contended that a physical entry is no longer required to conduct a search, as science has developed far more effective and insidious methods of invading privacy than those known to the framers. He criticized the majority's reliance on the "stultifying" and wrongly decided precedent of Olmstead, arguing that the spirit of the Amendment must protect private conversations from government eavesdropping, regardless of the physical means employed.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirmed and solidified the narrow "trespass doctrine" established in Olmstead v. United States, tying the Fourth Amendment's protection exclusively to physical intrusion into a protected space. By refusing to extend constitutional protection to conversations overheard by electronic means without a trespass, the Court allowed law enforcement to take advantage of new surveillance technologies. This ruling created a significant gap in privacy protection that persisted for 25 years until the Court abandoned the trespass doctrine in Katz v. United States (1967), replacing it with the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard.
