Golan v. Holder
565 U.S. 302, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 907, 181 L. Ed. 2d 835 (2012)
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Rule of Law:
Congress has the authority under the Copyright Clause to enact legislation that grants copyright protection to foreign works previously in the U.S. public domain. This exercise of power, particularly when intended to bring the U.S. into compliance with an international treaty, does not violate the First Amendment so long as it retains traditional copyright safeguards.
Facts:
- Historically, the United States did not grant copyright protection to many foreign creative works for reasons such as an author's failure to comply with U.S. legal formalities or the lack of copyright treaties with the work's country of origin.
- As a result, a large number of foreign works entered the public domain in the U.S., allowing anyone, including petitioners (orchestra conductors, musicians, and publishers), to copy, perform, and distribute them freely without payment.
- In 1989, the United States joined the Berne Convention, the principal international copyright treaty, which required member nations to protect foreign works that were still under copyright in their home country.
- To fully comply with its obligations under the Berne Convention, Congress enacted Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) in 1994.
- Section 514 "restored" U.S. copyright protection to certain foreign works, effectively removing them from the U.S. public domain.
- This change required users like the petitioners, who had previously used these works for free, to obtain permission from and pay royalties to the foreign copyright holders.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioners filed suit against the Attorney General in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, challenging the constitutionality of Section 514.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for the government.
- Petitioners appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
- The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Copyright Clause holding but remanded for the District Court to apply heightened First Amendment scrutiny to the law.
- On remand, the District Court found Section 514 violated the First Amendment and granted summary judgment for petitioners.
- The government, as appellant, appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which reversed the District Court's decision, holding that the law was constitutional.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted petitioners' writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which grants copyright protection to foreign works that were previously in the public domain in the United States, exceed Congress's authority under the Copyright Clause or violate the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
No. Section 514 of the URAA is a valid exercise of Congress's power and does not violate the Constitution. The Copyright Clause does not create an inviolable public domain that Congress can never alter. The Clause's 'limited Times' provision does not mean a copyright term, once expired or set to zero, is forever fixed. Historical practice, dating back to the first Copyright Act of 1790, shows Congress has previously granted protection to works that were in the public domain. The Clause's goal to 'promote the Progress of Science' is not limited to incentivizing new works; it also allows Congress to create intellectual property systems that, in its judgment, serve that goal, which includes promoting dissemination and harmonizing U.S. law with international standards like the Berne Convention. The First Amendment is not offended because copyright law's 'built-in' safeguards—the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense—sufficiently protect speech interests, as established in Eldred v. Ashcroft.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
Yes. The statute exceeds Congress's authority under the Copyright Clause and raises serious First Amendment concerns. The primary purpose of copyright is to provide a 'quid pro quo'—a limited monopoly to encourage the creation of new works for the public benefit. This statute fails that purpose because it protects only works that already exist, offering no incentive for new creation. Instead, it harms the public by removing millions of works from the public domain, increasing costs, creating prohibitive administrative burdens for users, and restricting the free flow of information that the First Amendment protects. The justification of complying with the Berne Convention is insufficient, as the treaty itself provides flexible options and allows for special agreements that the U.S. government failed to pursue to mitigate these harms.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Congress's broad authority to shape copyright law, clarifying that the public domain is not a constitutionally protected, untouchable realm. It affirms the principle from Eldred v. Ashcroft that the 'Progress of Science' can be promoted through means other than direct incentives for new creation, such as participating in international intellectual property regimes. The ruling reinforces a highly deferential standard of review for copyright legislation, indicating that as long as a law has a rational basis related to the Copyright Clause's goals and maintains traditional safeguards, it will likely withstand constitutional challenge. This gives Congress significant flexibility in adapting U.S. copyright law to global standards, even at the cost of altering public access to previously free works.
