Godesky v. Provo City Corp.
690 P.2d 541, 1984 Utah LEXIS 922 (1984)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under a comparative negligence framework, an intervening negligent act does not supersede an original actor's negligence and relieve them of liability if the intervening act was a foreseeable consequence of the original negligence; the determination of causation and apportionment of fault is a question for the jury.
Facts:
- Provo City owned and operated an uninsulated, 2,400-volt electrical wire that ran nine and one-half feet above the roof of an apartment building owned by Monticello Investors.
- The building's second story was added after Provo City installed the wires, bringing the roof into close proximity with them.
- Provo City admitted it had no inspection program, had not trimmed a tree obscuring a nearby transformer, and that running the uninsulated wire over a residence was against its policy.
- The plaintiff, an inexperienced roofer working for Pride Roofing Company, was hired to repair the roof of Monticello's building.
- During the job, a Pride Roofing supervisor instructed the plaintiff to tie off a lower, non-electrified wire to the upper, high-voltage wire to move it out of the way.
- A rope was thrown over the high-voltage wire and it was pulled down within the plaintiff's reach.
- When the plaintiff grasped the upper wire with both hands, he was severely electrocuted, resulting in the amputation of both of his arms below the elbows.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff sued Provo City and Monticello Investors in a Utah trial court.
- Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
- The jury apportioned fault as follows: Provo City 70%, Monticello Investors 20%, and Pride Roofing (a non-party) 10%. The jury found the plaintiff was not negligent.
- The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict against Provo City and Monticello Investors for approximately $1.6 million.
- Provo City (appellant) appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Utah.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does an employer's subsequent negligence constitute a superseding cause as a matter of law that relieves the original negligent actor, who created the dangerous condition, of all liability for an employee's injuries?
Opinions:
Majority - J. Dennis Frederick
No. An employer's subsequent negligence does not constitute a superseding cause as a matter of law that relieves the original negligent actor of liability. The court expressly overruled its prior holding in Hillyard, which made an intervening actor's knowledge of a danger a superseding cause as a matter of law. Citing Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, the court reasoned that the state's Comparative Negligence Statute requires the jury to compare the relative fault of all negligent parties. The proper test for superseding cause is foreseeability; if the subsequent negligent act was foreseeable to the original actor, it is a concurring cause, not a superseding one. Here, the jury properly compared the negligence of Provo (70%), Monticello (20%), and Pride (10%) and correctly determined that Provo's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
Concurring - Justice Howe
No. While concurring in the judgment, this opinion disagrees with the majority's conclusion that Provo's trial objection to a jury instruction was insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. Justice Howe argues the objection was adequate given the context of the trial. However, he agrees the error was harmless because there is no meaningful legal difference between instructing the jury that compliance with a safety code is 'prima facie evidence' of safety versus 'evidence which would support a finding' of safety, as both formulations allow the jury to weigh competing evidence.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Utah's move away from the harsh, all-or-nothing doctrine of superseding cause toward a modern comparative fault analysis. By explicitly overruling the part of Hillyard that treated an intervening actor's knowledge of a danger as a superseding cause as a matter of law, the court empowers the jury to be the ultimate arbiter of causation and fault apportionment. This ruling reinforces the principle of foreseeability as the key determinant in cases with multiple negligent actors. It ensures that original tortfeasors who create dangerous conditions cannot easily escape liability by pointing to the subsequent, foreseeable negligence of others.
