Glossip v. Oklahoma
604 U.S. 226 (2025)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A conviction obtained through the knowing use of false evidence violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, requiring a new trial if the false testimony could in any reasonable likelihood have affected the jury’s judgment.
Facts:
- In 1997, Justin Sneed beat Barry Van Treese to death with a baseball bat at an Oklahoma hotel owned by Van Treese and managed by Richard Glossip.
- Richard Glossip initially made inconsistent statements to police about Sneed's role in the murder but ultimately told police that Sneed admitted to killing Van Treese.
- Justin Sneed later claimed Richard Glossip had asked him to murder Barry Van Treese because Glossip wanted to steal Van Treese’s money and manage the motel without him.
- Richard Glossip maintained his innocence and refused a plea deal that would have had him avoid the death penalty in return for testifying against Sneed; Sneed then testified against Glossip in exchange for avoiding the death penalty.
- At Richard Glossip's retrial, Justin Sneed provided inconsistent testimony on potential motives for Glossip's murder.
- Justin Sneed denied that he had been prescribed lithium or seen a psychiatrist, claiming he received lithium after asking for Sudafed for a cold.
- The State later discovered additional documents revealing Justin Sneed had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed lithium by Dr. Trombka, a psychiatrist at the Oklahoma County jail, contradicting his trial testimony.
- Prosecutor Connie Smothermon's notes from a pre-trial conversation with Justin Sneed mentioned 'lithium' and 'Dr. Trumpet' (referring to Dr. Trombka), indicating her awareness of Sneed's psychiatric treatment.
Procedural Posture:
- A jury convicted Richard Glossip of capital murder and sentenced him to death.
- The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) overturned Glossip's conviction, finding ineffective assistance of counsel in challenging Sneed's testimony, and remanded for retrial.
- At the retrial, a jury again convicted Richard Glossip of capital murder and sentenced him to death.
- A closely divided OCCA affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that circumstantial evidence sufficiently corroborated Sneed's testimony.
- Richard Glossip subsequently filed several unsuccessful habeas petitions in state and federal courts.
- Richard Glossip filed a motion for post-conviction relief with the OCCA based on newly disclosed documents from an independent investigation; Oklahoma waived procedural defenses and asked the OCCA to deny the claims on their merits.
- The OCCA denied Glossip's claims as procedurally barred and meritless.
- Richard Glossip filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief with the OCCA after the State discovered additional documents revealing Sneed's bipolar diagnosis and lithium prescription, which the Attorney General supported, conceding multiple errors that warranted a new trial.
- The OCCA denied the unopposed petition without a hearing, holding that Glossip’s claims were procedurally barred under Oklahoma’s Post-Conviction Procedures Act (PCPA) and that the State’s concession was not “based in law or fact” because it did not create a Napue error.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a prosecutor's knowing failure to correct false testimony from a key witness about their psychiatric treatment and reasons for medication violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, warranting a new trial, especially when that witness's credibility was determinative to the conviction?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Sotomayor
Yes, a prosecutor's knowing failure to correct false testimony from a key witness about their psychiatric treatment and reasons for medication violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, warranting a new trial, especially when that witness's credibility was determinative to the conviction. The Court held that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' (OCCA) judgment rested on a state law ground (the PCPA) that was not independent and adequate, as its application depended on an antecedent rejection of the Attorney General's confession of a Napue error, which was based solely on federal law. Under Napue v. Illinois, a conviction obtained through the knowing use of false evidence violates the Due Process Clause. To establish a Napue violation, a defendant must show the prosecution knowingly solicited or allowed false testimony to go uncorrected. If a violation is established, a new trial is warranted if the false testimony could 'in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.' Here, the record supported the Attorney General's concession that Justin Sneed's testimony about his lithium prescription and never seeing a psychiatrist was false, and the prosecution knowingly failed to correct it. Sneed's medical records showed a bipolar diagnosis and lithium prescription from a psychiatrist, Dr. Trombka, contradicting Sneed's claim of being given lithium by mistake after asking for Sudafed. Prosecutor Smothermon's notes, mentioning 'lithium' and 'Dr. Trumpet' (Trombka), indicated her pre-trial awareness of Sneed's psychiatric treatment. Sneed's testimony was the only direct evidence of Glossip's guilt of capital murder, making the jury's assessment of Sneed's credibility necessarily determinative. Correcting Sneed's lie would have severely undermined his credibility by revealing his willingness to lie under oath. Furthermore, evidence of Sneed's bipolar disorder, which could trigger impulsive violence when combined with drug use, would have contradicted the prosecution's portrayal of Sneed as a harmless 'puppet' without Glossip’s influence. The Court concluded there was a reasonable likelihood that correcting Sneed's testimony would have affected the jury's judgment. The Court also noted additional prosecutorial misconduct, such as violating the rule of sequestration, destroying evidence, and withholding witness statements, further undermined confidence in the verdict. The OCCA's contrary holding—that the defense was aware Sneed took lithium or that Sneed was in denial—was a mistaken interpretation of Napue, as the Due Process Clause imposes the duty to correct false testimony on the State, not the defense, and the falsity of the testimony is what matters, not the witness's subjective belief.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Justice Barrett
No, the Court should not order the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) to set aside Richard Glossip's conviction because the OCCA did not make factual findings on critical questions, and the record allows for multiple plausible interpretations. Justice Barrett agreed with the majority on jurisdiction, finding the OCCA's opinion insufficiently clear on whether its state-law procedural bar was truly independent of federal law. She also agreed that the OCCA misapplied Napue, particularly its reasoning that Sneed's testimony was 'not clearly false' due to denial, and its failure to recognize that a prosecutor's forced correction of a star witness's lie could significantly impact credibility. However, Justice Barrett argued that the Supreme Court exceeded its appellate role by acting as an initial fact-finder. To establish a Napue violation, Glossip needed to show both that Sneed gave false testimony and that prosecutor Smothermon knew it was false. These showings largely relied on Smothermon’s ambiguous notes ('on Lithium?' and 'Dr. Trumpet?') which are open to several competing interpretations. Given the OCCA's failure to make its own factual findings and the ambiguities in the record, Justice Barrett concluded that the Court should have instead corrected the OCCA's misstatements of federal law, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for the OCCA to conduct its own factual determinations, including whether an evidentiary hearing was necessary.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
No, the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the case because the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' (OCCA) judgment rests on adequate and independent state grounds, and even if jurisdiction existed, no Napue violation occurred, and the Court has no authority to order a new trial. Justice Thomas asserted that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction because the OCCA's decision to deny Glossip's successive post-conviction petition was based on the independent and adequate state law grounds of Oklahoma’s Post-Conviction Procedures Act (PCPA), specifically its diligence and actual-innocence requirements. He argued that the OCCA's finding that the State's confession of error was 'not based in law or fact' referred to the PCPA's state-law requirements, not an antecedent federal ruling, and that the majority's interpretation of the OCCA's opinion was a misreading. Even assuming jurisdiction, Justice Thomas argued that no Napue violation occurred because Sneed’s allegedly false testimony was not material. He reasoned that Glossip’s defense team already knew of Sneed’s mental condition and lithium prescription since 1997 from a competency report but made a strategic decision not to emphasize it at trial, thus the alleged falsity about why Sneed took lithium or whether he saw a psychiatrist would not have affected the jury's verdict. He criticized the majority's redefinition of Napue materiality, arguing it should focus on the content of the false testimony itself, not the hypothetical impact of a correction. Justice Thomas further contended the Court lacked the authority to order a new trial, emphasizing that the Supreme Court does not have supervisory power over state courts and cannot order relief that a state court could legitimately refuse. He noted that the PCPA does not authorize the OCCA to order a new trial at the initial review stage of a post-conviction petition, but rather a remand to the trial court for a merits determination, and that there were several other unaddressed state-law grounds (e.g., PCPA’s prejudice standard, timeliness) that could preclude relief. Finally, he emphasized the need for an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes, especially concerning the ambiguous notes and alternative interpretations offered by the Van Treese family.
Analysis:
This case significantly reaffirms the constitutional obligation of prosecutors under Napue v. Illinois to correct false testimony, even when it primarily impacts a witness's credibility rather than direct evidence of the crime. By clarifying the interplay between state procedural bars and federal constitutional errors, the Supreme Court signals that states cannot easily insulate federal due process violations from review through ambiguous state court rulings. The ruling also underscores the high bar for harmlessness when prosecutorial misconduct involves a key witness's false testimony, especially in capital cases where credibility is paramount. This decision may lead to increased scrutiny of prosecutorial conduct and the potential impact of seemingly minor testimonial falsities on overall trial fairness in future cases, prompting prosecutors to be more diligent in ensuring the accuracy of witness statements.
