Glendle Cain, III v. Owensboro Public Schools
711 F.3d 623, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 6159, 2013 WL 1235592 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
The mid-year revocation of an out-of-district student's privilege to attend a school is a de facto expulsion requiring due process. Furthermore, a school official's search of a student's cell phone text messages is unconstitutional unless justified at its inception by a reasonable suspicion that the search will reveal evidence of further wrongdoing or imminent danger, which is not established by the mere violation of a cell-phone-use policy.
Facts:
- G.C. was an out-of-district student attending Owensboro High School under a reciprocal agreement.
- During his time at the school, G.C. had several disciplinary infractions and communicated to school officials that he used drugs, was disposed to anger and depression, and had contemplated suicide.
- In March 2009, after G.C. left school without permission and expressed suicidal thoughts, Assistant Principal Christina Smith checked his cell phone out of concern for his well-being.
- In June 2009, Superintendent Dr. Larry Vick allowed G.C. to continue attending Owensboro High School for the next academic year on the explicit condition that any further disciplinary infraction would result in the immediate revocation of this privilege.
- On September 2, 2009, a teacher caught G.C. sending text messages in class, a violation of school policy.
- The teacher confiscated the phone and gave it to Assistant Principal Melissa Brown.
- Brown, aware of G.C.'s history of angry outbursts, past drug use, and prior suicidal ideation, read four text messages on the phone to determine if he might harm himself or others.
- Following the texting incident, Vick revoked G.C.'s out-of-district privilege, barring him from continuing to attend Owensboro High School.
Procedural Posture:
- G.C. filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky against Owensboro Public Schools and several school officials.
- The complaint alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights and Kentucky state law.
- The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims.
- The district court (the trial court) granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on G.C.'s federal claims.
- G.C. (as appellant) appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on his due process and Fourth Amendment claims to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, with the school officials as appellees.
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Issue:
1. Does the mid-year revocation of an out-of-district student's attendance privilege for a disciplinary infraction constitute an expulsion that triggers due process protections under Kentucky law? 2. Does a school official violate a student's Fourth Amendment rights by searching the text messages on the student's cell phone when the only infraction is the student's use of the phone in class, even if the official has general background knowledge of the student's past disciplinary problems and emotional issues?
Opinions:
Majority - Moore, J.
1. Yes. The mid-year revocation of an out-of-district student's attendance privilege is the functional equivalent of an expulsion, which requires a pre-expulsion hearing under Kentucky law. The court distinguished between a superintendent's discretion over student 'enrollment' before an academic year begins and a student's right to 'attend' once the year has commenced. Relying on a persuasive Kentucky Attorney General Opinion, the court held that once a non-resident student is permitted to attend for the school year, their removal for disciplinary reasons constitutes an expulsion subject to due process protections. The court distinguished its precedent in Daniels v. Woodside, which involved a denial of re-enrollment between academic years, not a removal during the academic year. 2. Yes. A school official violates a student's Fourth Amendment rights under these circumstances. Applying the two-part test from New Jersey v. T.L.O., the court found the search was not justified at its inception. General background knowledge of a student's past issues is insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that searching a phone for a simple texting violation will reveal evidence of further wrongdoing or imminent harm. The act of texting in class, by itself, does not provide the specific, articulable suspicion required to justify a search of the phone's contents.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Norris, J.
1. (Concurring) Yes. The judge agreed with the majority that G.C. was entitled to due process protections and that the case should be remanded to the district court to determine if the procedures afforded were sufficient. 2. (Dissenting) No. The search did not violate G.C.'s Fourth Amendment rights because it was reasonable under all the circumstances. The dissent emphasized the relaxed standard for school searches under T.L.O. and the school's in loco parentis duty. Given the official's awareness of G.C.'s history of suicidal thoughts, drug use, and fighting, a limited search of four text messages was a reasonable measure to ensure his and others' safety after he was caught violating a school rule.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the rights of students in two key areas. First, it establishes that removing a non-resident student mid-year is a 'de facto expulsion,' preventing schools from using a student's residential status as a loophole to bypass due process requirements. Second, and more broadly, it sets a crucial precedent for student cell phone searches, rejecting a categorical rule that any violation of a phone-use policy justifies a content search. The ruling requires a nexus between the initial infraction and the suspicion that a search will uncover evidence of a different, more serious issue, thereby protecting student privacy against overly broad interpretations of school authority.
