Glavin v. Eckman
71 Mass. App. Ct. 313, 881 N.E.2d 820 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
Under a statute providing damages for the wrongful cutting of trees, damages are not limited to the timber's value or the property's diminution in market value. A court may award the reasonable cost of restoring the property, especially when the trees held unique, personal value to the owner and traditional damages would not provide fair compensation.
Facts:
- James A. Glavin owned a 1.7-acre lot that featured a stand of ten large, mature oak trees, which he valued for shade and as a backdrop for a pond he planned to restore.
- Bruce and Shelly Eckman, whose adjacent property had an ocean view, previously asked Glavin for permission to cut down these specific trees to enhance their view, but Glavin refused.
- In 2001, the Eckmans hired landscaper Jon R. Fragosa to clear trees to maximize their water view.
- While standing on their deck, the Eckmans directed Fragosa on the scope of the job, and it was apparent that most of the trees targeted were not on the Eckmans' property.
- Fragosa obtained permission from another neighbor, Bea Gentry, to cut trees on her lot but failed to ascertain the property boundaries.
- In executing the job for the Eckmans, Fragosa crossed 50 to 100 feet onto Glavin's property and cut down the ten mature oak trees that Glavin had previously refused to have removed.
Procedural Posture:
- James A. Glavin sued the Eckmans and Jon R. Fragosa in a state trial court for the wrongful cutting of his trees pursuant to G. L. c. 242, § 7.
- A jury returned a special verdict for Glavin, finding that both the Eckmans and Fragosa wilfully cut the trees without good reason to believe they were authorized.
- The jury assessed damages at $30,000, representing the 'reasonable cost of restoring the property as nearly as reasonably possible to its original condition.'
- The trial judge trebled the jury's damage assessment to $90,000 as required by the statute.
- The Eckmans and Fragosa, as appellants, appealed the judgment to the Massachusetts Appeals Court, with Glavin as the appellee.
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Issue:
Under a statute providing damages for the wrongful cutting of trees, may a property owner recover the reasonable cost of restoring the property to its original condition when traditional measures like timber value or diminution in market value do not adequately compensate for the loss?
Opinions:
Majority - Grasso, J.
Yes. A property owner may recover reasonable restoration costs when traditional damage measures are inadequate. The statute governing wrongful tree cutting, G. L. c. 242, § 7, does not prescribe a specific method for measuring damages. Limiting damages to timber value or diminution in market value would fail to adequately compensate the owner and would encourage wrongdoers to engage in 'self-help' to improve their property at a neighbor's expense, especially since removing trees for a view might not diminish, or could even increase, the property's market value. Citing Trinity Church v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., the court affirmed that restoration costs are a permissible measure of damages where the property is unique or has special value to the owner and ordinary methods would result in a 'miscarriage of justice.' This measure is subject to a test of reasonableness, requiring that the restoration itself be necessary and its cost not disproportionate to the injury. Here, the trees had special value to Glavin, the injury was significant, and the jury's award was a reasonable assessment of the cost to restore the property as nearly as possible to its original condition.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the measure of damages for the destruction of property with subjective or aesthetic value, such as mature trees. It establishes that 'restoration cost' is a viable alternative to purely market-based measures like 'diminution in value,' especially when the latter would inadequately compensate the plaintiff. This precedent strengthens landowners' rights against trespass and intentional property damage by ensuring that damages can account for the personal, non-commercial value of their property. The ruling makes it more difficult for wrongdoers to calculate their potential liability as a mere 'cost of doing business,' as the damages can now be tied to the much higher cost of replacement rather than just timber or land value.
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