Glasser v. United States
315 U.S. 60 (1942)
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Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel is violated when a trial court appoints a defendant's chosen counsel to simultaneously represent a co-defendant with potentially conflicting interests, especially when the defendant has objected to the appointment.
Facts:
- Daniel Glasser and Norton Kretske were assistant United States attorneys for the Northern District of Illinois, assigned to prosecute federal liquor law violations.
- After Kretske resigned to enter private practice, he, Glasser, and another private attorney, Alfred Roth, allegedly engaged in a criminal conspiracy.
- The conspiracy involved soliciting payments from individuals who were being, or were about to be, charged with federal liquor law violations.
- These payments were allegedly used to corruptly influence Glasser and Kretske in the performance of their official duties to ensure favorable outcomes for those under investigation.
- Kretske referred individuals needing legal representation to Roth, who in some cases was paid by Kretske rather than the clients.
- During the scheme, Kretske allegedly made statements to individuals paying bribes that part of the money was for 'Red' or the 'red-head,' understood to be references to Glasser.
Procedural Posture:
- Glasser, Kretske, and Roth were charged by indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois with conspiracy to defraud the United States.
- At the start of the trial, the district court appointed Glasser's retained counsel, Stewart, to also represent co-defendant Kretske, despite Stewart raising a potential conflict and Glasser objecting.
- Following a jury trial, Glasser, Kretske, and Roth were convicted.
- The defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of all defendants.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
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Issue:
Does a trial court's appointment of a defendant's chosen counsel to also represent a co-defendant with potentially conflicting interests, over the first defendant's objection, violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Murphy
Yes. A court order requiring one lawyer to simultaneously represent co-defendants with conflicting interests violates the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of untrammeled and unimpaired assistance of counsel. The right to counsel is too fundamental to be impaired by such a judicial appointment. Glasser initially objected to his attorney, Stewart, also representing his co-defendant Kretske, and his subsequent silence did not constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver of this right. The trial court has a duty to protect an accused's rights, not to create a situation that impairs them. The conflict of interest materialized when Stewart failed to cross-examine a witness and failed to object to hearsay testimony that was damaging to Glasser, likely to avoid prejudicing Kretske. The precise degree of prejudice need not be calculated; the denial of the fundamental right itself constitutes reversible error for Glasser.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Frankfurter
No. The appointment did not violate Glasser's Sixth Amendment rights under the circumstances. Glasser, an experienced criminal attorney, initially objected but then tacitly acquiesced in the arrangement and failed to raise the issue at any point during the month-long trial, in post-trial motions, or in his initial grounds for appeal. The claim of a constitutional violation was a belated 'lawyer's afterthought' and should not be credited. Furthermore, there was no showing of actual prejudice; Stewart's decision not to cross-examine a witness was a reasonable trial tactic, and his failure to object to certain testimony was not deficient because the evidence was likely admissible against Glasser anyway under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
Analysis:
This decision firmly establishes that the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel includes the right to conflict-free representation. It places a significant, affirmative duty on trial judges to safeguard this right, especially in multi-defendant cases. The Court's holding rejects a presumption of waiver from a defendant's silence following an initial objection, setting a high bar for what constitutes an 'intelligent and competent' waiver of this right. This precedent is foundational for modern conflict-of-interest analysis in criminal defense, requiring courts to proactively inquire into potential conflicts and respect a defendant's desire for the undivided loyalty of their counsel.
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