Gilmore v. City of Montgomery

Supreme Court of the United States
41 L. Ed. 2d 304, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 13, 417 U.S. 556 (1974)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A city's provision of exclusive use of its public recreational facilities to racially segregated private schools constitutes unconstitutional state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, as it provides significant aid to private discrimination and undermines existing desegregation orders.

Facts:

The City of Montgomery, Alabama, previously enforced a municipal ordinance requiring racial segregation in its public parks.
After a 1959 federal court order mandated the desegregation of its parks, the City of Montgomery closed all public parks to all citizens.
Following the desegregation order, the City engaged in a 'coordinated effort' with the local YMCA to perpetuate segregated recreational programs, using city facilities and resources.
After reopening the parks, the City of Montgomery adopted a policy of allowing private, racially segregated schools and other private segregated groups to use public recreational facilities, such as stadiums and athletic fields.
Many of these private segregated schools were formed in reaction to a federal court order to desegregate Montgomery's public school system.
The city's provision of these facilities allowed the private schools to offer complete athletic programs, which resulted in capital savings for the schools and enhanced their attractiveness as an alternative to the desegregated public school system.

Procedural Posture:

In 1958, Negro citizens (petitioners) filed a class action lawsuit against the City of Montgomery in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, seeking to desegregate the city's public parks.
In 1959, the District Court declared the city's park segregation ordinance unconstitutional and enjoined the city from enforcing segregation in its parks.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment and ordered the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the case.
In 1970, petitioners filed a motion for supplemental relief, alleging the city was circumventing the court's order.
In 1972, the District Court granted the motion, issuing an injunction that prohibited the city from permitting the use of its recreational facilities by any racially segregated private schools or other private groups.
The City of Montgomery appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit reversed in part, upholding the injunction only as it applied to the 'exclusive' use of facilities by segregated private schools, while striking down the ban on 'non-exclusive' use and any use by other private non-school groups.
The original plaintiffs (petitioners) then sought and were granted a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States.

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Issue:

Does a city's policy of permitting racially segregated private schools and other private groups to use public recreational facilities violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly when the city is under a court order to desegregate its parks and schools?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Blackmun

Yes, in part. A city's policy of providing exclusive use of its public recreational facilities to segregated private schools is unconstitutional because it creates 'enclaves of segregation,' violates the city's affirmative duty to desegregate, and constitutes significant state assistance that undermines a federal school desegregation order. The Court reasoned that by allowing exclusive use of stadiums and fields, the city significantly enhanced the attractiveness of segregated private schools, enabling them to offer athletic programs and divert funds elsewhere, thereby impeding the establishment of a unitary public school system. However, for non-exclusive use of facilities by school groups and any use by private non-school groups, the factual record is insufficient to determine whether there is significant state involvement. The case is remanded for the district court to make further findings on these uses by 'sifting facts and weighing circumstances' on a case-by-case basis.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Justice Marshall

Yes. The District Court's original, broader injunction should be reinstated in its entirety. The appellate courts improperly projected the order onto abstract problems not before the District Court, such as non-exclusive use of zoos and museums. The District Court judge, who had intimate familiarity with Montgomery's history of evading desegregation, crafted a permissible and appropriate remedy for the specific unconstitutional state action brought to its attention, and his judgment should be respected without modification.

Concurring - Justice Brennan

Yes. The injunction should be sustained, and on remand, it should be broadened to enjoin any school-sponsored or school-directed use of city facilities that duplicates public school operations at public expense, not just 'exclusive' use. Citing Norwood v. Harrison, any assistance that financially benefits private segregated schools by relieving them of expenses is unconstitutional. However, for non-school groups and non-financial benefit uses (like field trips to a zoo), remand is appropriate for further fact-finding to determine if such uses impair the desegregation decrees.

Concurring - Justice White

Yes. The District Court's order should be sustained to a greater extent than the majority allows. The injunction should bar not only exclusive use but also any use of city facilities by segregated schools for events that are part of the school curriculum or organized school programs. He argues that there is plainly state action whenever the city permits the use of its scarce facilities; the only question is whether that state action denies equal protection. Permitting such uses provides significant aid to the schools' segregated policies, making the state a 'joint participant' under the standard of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.

Analysis:

This case refines the 'state action' doctrine, clarifying that providing tangible, significant aid to private discriminatory entities can constitute unconstitutional government action. The decision establishes a strong precedent against government support for 'segregation academies' that formed to evade school desegregation orders. By distinguishing between 'exclusive' and 'non-exclusive' use, the Court created a framework for lower courts to analyze the degree of state involvement, mandating a case-by-case factual inquiry rather than a bright-line rule. This leaves open questions about incidental or non-exclusive benefits, ensuring future litigation will focus on whether state assistance has a 'significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination.'

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