No. The court explained that while it's a crime to spread lies about a dead person (because it could make their family angry and start a fight), it doesn't give the family the right to sue for money. A lawsuit for damaging someone's reputation (called 'defamation') is a personal right that belongs only to the person being insulted. Since that person is dead, their right to sue died with them. The court said that if this rule is going to change, the state's official lawmakers have to create a new law; it's not the court's job to do it.

No, you can't sue for that. If someone lies in court to prevent you from winning a wrongful death case, they might be guilty of a crime like perjury, but that doesn't mean you can sue them for money. While an old legal expert named Chancellor Kent said that libel (written defamation) can be about hurting the memory of someone dead or the reputation of someone alive, traditional law only treats this as a crime, not something you can sue over. This is because the main reason for punishing people who say bad things about the dead is to prevent fights and keep the peace, not to give money to the dead person's family. Almost all court cases agree that you can't sue for defamation of a dead person under traditional law. Only the government (Legislature) can change these old laws to allow such lawsuits. Until they do that, we have to follow the traditional rule that says no to these kinds of lawsuits.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<opinion type="majority">
<author id="b283-8">
 RodmaN, J.
 </author>

 If, as alleged, defendant with the intent to prevent plaintiff from recovering damages for the wrongful death of his intestate, took pictures falsely depicting conditions at the wreck and knowingly used or permitted the use of such pictures in the trial of plaintiff’s action, he would be guilty of perjury or subornation of perjury. This conduct would support criminal prosecution but would not create civil liability.
 
 Gillikin v. Springle, ante
 
 240.
 

 We do not understand from our reading of the complaint that
 
 *246
 
 plaintiff intends to allege a wrongful act done to the body, but if 'he does intend to assert some such right of action, it is barred by the statute of limitations, G.S. 1-52(5). The collision occurred 2 July 1956. This action was begun 20 August 1959: Since the bar appears from the pleadings, the court could properly dismiss the action.
 
 Nowell v. Hamilton,
 
 249 N.C. 523, 107 S.E. 2d 112.
 

 But plaintiff does not limit his -right to recover to- these allegations. He also seeks to recover because of “scurrilous and defamatory pictures which tended to reflect upon” deceased, which pictures, were “distributed and exhibited. . .-throughout Carteret County with the wicked and evil intent of casting aspersions and indignities upon the deceased.”
 

 Chancellor Kent defined libel as a malicious publication tending to blacken the memory of one dead or the reputation of one alive. This definition of a libel has been referred to with approval by this Court in several cases.
 
 Simmons v. Morse,
 
 51 N.C. 6;
 
 Davis v. Retail Stores, Inc.,
 
 211 N.C. 551, 191 S.E. 33;
 
 Flake v. News Co.,
 
 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55. It is the definition most frequently used in defining libel. 33 Am. Jur. 38; 53 C.J.S. 32.
 

 Since a libel is apt to create a breach of the peace, it is a common law crime. 33 Am. Jur. 291, 53 C.J.S. 409;
 
 Kennerly v. Hennessy,
 
 19 A.L.R. 1468, with annotations. It has been recognized as such by us.
 
 S. v. Powers,
 
 34 N.C. 5;
 
 S. v. Townsend,
 
 86 N.C. 676;
 
 S. v. Lyon,
 
 89 N.C. 568;
 
 S. v. McIntire,
 
 115 N.C. 769. The common law, except as modified by statute, is in force in this State. G.S. 4-1;
 
 S. v. Hampton,
 
 210 N.C. 283, 186 S.E. 251. The Legislature has enlarged the class of things which are criminal because defamatory. G.S. 14-47, 48.
 

 “It is a misdemeanor at common law, punishable on indictment with fine and imprisonment, to write and publish defamatory matter of any person deceased, provided it be published with the malevolent purpose to injure his family and posterity, and to expose them to contempt and disgrace; for the chief reason of punishing offenses of this nature is their tendency to a breach of the peace. And although the party be dead at the time of publishing the libel, yet it stirs up others of the same family, blood or society to revenge and to break the peace.” Newell, Slander and Libel, 4th ed.-, p. 931.
 

 Not all criminal acts gave a right of action for damages at common law. The wrongful killing of a human being, even though criminal, gave no right of action until the enactment of Lord Campbell’s Act. G.S. 28-173. We have never been called upon to determine whether a right of action existed for damages for the defamation of a dead person, but since, as noted, the common law applies in North Carolina except as amended by statute, we turn to common law to ascertain
 
 *247
 
 if it afforded such a right of action. The cases are practically unanimous in holding that no such right existed.
 
 Renfro Drug Co, v. Lawson,
 
 160 S.W. 2d 246, 146 A.L.R. 732, with annotations, 739;
 
 Rose v. Daily Mirror,
 
 31 N.E. 2d 182, 132 A.L.R. 888;
 
 Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Company
 
 (Calif.), 325 P 2d 659;
 
 Hughes v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co.,
 
 43 N.E. 2d 657; 33 Am. Jur. 42; 53 C.J.S. 53.
 

 The Legislature has the power to modify the common law and permit an action for damages for defamation of a dead person, designating the person who may sue and how the sums recovered shall be distributed. Until the Legislature authorizes such actions, we feel impelled to adhere to the common law denying a right of action. Manifestly the Legislature has not been inadvertent to the law of libel. Illustrative of the attention which it has given to the subject, see c. 99 of the General Statutes, G.S. 28-175, G.S. 14-47, 48, and 401.3.
 

 Plaintiff makes no attempt to allege an invasion of his right of privacy.
 
 Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Company,
 
 76 N.W. 2d 762;
 
 Kelly v. Post Publishing Co.,
 
 98 N.E. 2d 286.
 

 Since plaintiff has not alleged a cause of action not barred by the statute of limitations, the court properly dismissed the action.
 

 Affirmed.
 
</opinion>

No. A living relative does not have a civil cause of action for damages for the libel of a deceased person. The court recognized that libel of the dead is a misdemeanor at common law, primarily because it tends to provoke the deceased's family to a breach of the peace. However, the court distinguished between a criminal offense and a civil right of action for damages, noting that not all criminal acts create civil liability. Citing the near-unanimous view of common law jurisdictions, the court held that a claim for defamation is personal to the individual defamed and is extinguished upon their death. The court concluded that while the North Carolina Legislature has the power to create such a cause of action by statute, it has not done so, and therefore the court is bound to follow the common law rule denying the right to sue.

No. Because the common law, except as modified by statute, does not provide a civil cause of action for the defamation of a deceased person. If the defendant did falsely depict conditions at the wreck site with intent to prevent plaintiff from recovering damages, such conduct would support criminal prosecution for perjury or subornation of perjury but would not create civil liability. While Chancellor Kent defined libel as a malicious publication tending to blacken the memory of one dead or the reputation of one alive, and this definition has been referred to with approval by this Court, libel of the dead has historically been treated as a criminal offense due to its tendency to create a breach of peace. The cases reviewed are practically unanimous in holding that no civil right of action existed at common law for defamation of the deceased. The wrongful killing of a human being, even though criminal, gave no right of action until the enactment of Lord Campbell's Act. The Legislature has the power to modify the common law to permit such actions, but until then, the common law denying a right of action must be adhered to. The Legislature has not been inadvertent to the law of libel, as evidenced by various statutes addressing the subject. Additionally, the plaintiff makes no attempt to allege an invasion of his right of privacy, which might have provided an alternative cause of action.

Gillikin v. Bell

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