Gilligan v. Morgan
93 S. Ct. 2440, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 39, 413 U.S. 1 (1973)
Rule of Law:
Federal courts lack jurisdiction under the political question doctrine to assume continuing regulatory oversight over the training, weaponry, and internal organization of a state's National Guard, as these matters are explicitly committed to the Legislative and Executive Branches of government by the Constitution.
Facts:
- In May 1970, civil disorder occurred on and around the Kent State University campus in Ohio.
- The Governor of Ohio called the National Guard to duty to preserve civil order and protect public property.
- During this period, actions by the National Guard allegedly violated students' rights of speech and assembly.
- The National Guard's actions allegedly caused injury to several students and death to several others.
- Respondents were full-time students and officers in the student government at Kent State University.
- Respondents alleged the National Guard's actions were without legal justification.
Procedural Posture:
- Respondents, full-time students and student government officers at Kent State University, filed an action in the District Court on October 15, 1970, alleging constitutional violations by the Ohio National Guard and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.
- The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal with respect to injunctive relief against the Governor's future employment of the Guard and the validity of a state statute.
- The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, reversed the District Court's dismissal regarding one issue and remanded it for a determination of whether a pattern of training, weaponry, and orders in the Ohio National Guard required or made inevitable the use of fatal force when non-lethal force would suffice.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the action of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a federal court have jurisdiction under the political question doctrine to assume continuing regulatory jurisdiction over the training, weaponry, and orders of a state's National Guard, or are these matters nonjusticiable, falling within the exclusive purview of the Legislative and Executive Branches?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Burger
No, a federal court does not have jurisdiction to assume continuing regulatory jurisdiction over the training, weaponry, and orders of a state's National Guard, as these matters present a nonjusticiable political question reserved to the Legislative and Executive Branches. The Court held that the relief sought, requiring initial judicial review and continuing surveillance by a federal court over the Guard's activities, would involve critical areas of responsibility vested by Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of the Constitution in Congress (to organize, arm, and discipline the Militia) and by statutory authority in the President as Commander-in-Chief. The Court emphasized the lack of judicial competence in complex, subtle, and professional military judgments regarding the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force. Citing Baker v. Carr, the Court concluded that undertaking such a role would involve a serious conflict with a coordinate political department, a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards, and an initial policy determination clearly for nonjudicial discretion, thereby violating the separation of powers. The Court distinguished this broad demand for continuing oversight from actions seeking damages for specific unlawful conduct or restraining specific, imminently threatened unlawful actions, which might be justiciable.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Blackmun
No, a federal court does not have jurisdiction to assume continuing regulatory jurisdiction over the training, weaponry, and orders of a state's National Guard, as the relief sought is beyond the province of the judiciary. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Powell, agreed with the majority's conclusion that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. He noted that the specific issues regarding the Ohio Guard's use-of-force rules had been largely resolved by changes making them identical to Army rules and by the provision of special civil-disturbance-control training. He stated that the respondents' remaining request for continuing judicial surveillance of these 'highly subjective and technical matters involving military training and command' presented an 'inappropriate subject matter for judicial consideration,' lacking judicially manageable standards as per Baker v. Carr. Justice Blackmun also raised concerns about mootness and the respondents' standing, noting the complaint was based on a single past incident with speculative future harm.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Douglas
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Marshall, would have dismissed the case as moot. They were convinced that for many of the reasons stated in Part I of the Court's opinion, the case no longer presented a live controversy due to factual changes since the complaint was filed, such as the named respondents no longer being students, the officials no longer holding office, and the adoption of new 'use of force' rules and revised training for the Ohio National Guard. Accordingly, they would have vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the District Court with directions to dismiss it as moot, rather than ruling on the justiciability question.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the political question doctrine, particularly concerning judicial intervention in military affairs. It establishes a high bar for federal courts to assert jurisdiction over the internal operations, training, and weaponry of military forces, emphasizing the separation of powers and the lack of judicial competence in such technical areas. Future cases challenging military conduct will likely face scrutiny regarding whether the relief sought constitutes ongoing oversight versus a request for damages or injunctions against specific, discrete unlawful acts. The ruling reaffirms that broad regulatory control over military institutions is reserved for the political branches, limiting the scope of federal judicial review in this domain.
