Gillette v. United States
28 L. Ed. 2d 168, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 69, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
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Rule of Law:
The conscientious objector exemption under Section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act, which is limited to persons who are conscientiously opposed to participation in all wars, does not violate the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Objection to a particular war, even if based on sincere religious or conscientious beliefs, does not qualify for this statutory exemption.
Facts:
- Guy Gillette stated that his objection to American military operations in Vietnam was based on a 'humanist approach to religion' and fundamental principles of conscience.
- Gillette was willing to participate in a war of national defense or a war sponsored by the United Nations as a peace-keeping measure, but characterized the Vietnam conflict as 'unjust.'
- Louis Negre, a devout Catholic, came to believe that the Vietnam conflict was an 'unjust' war after completing his infantry training.
- Negre's religious training taught him that it was his duty as a faithful Catholic to discriminate between 'just' and 'unjust' wars and to refuse to participate in the latter.
- Negre firmly believed that any personal involvement in the Vietnam war would contravene his conscience and his religious training.
Procedural Posture:
- Gillette unsuccessfully requested a conscientious objector classification from his draft board and was subsequently convicted in a U.S. District Court for willful failure to report for induction.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed Gillette's conviction.
- After being inducted into the Army, Negre's application for discharge as a conscientious objector was denied by the Army.
- Negre filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a U.S. District Court, which was denied.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Negre's habeas petition.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases to resolve the issue.
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Issue:
Does Section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act, by exempting only those conscientiously opposed to 'participation in war in any form' and not those who object to a particular war, violate the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Marshall
No. Section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act, which exempts only those opposed to all wars, does not violate the First Amendment. Statutorily, the phrase 'conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form' unambiguously means opposition to all wars, not selective opposition to a particular conflict. Constitutionally, the statute does not violate the Establishment Clause because it is neutral and secular in purpose. It does not favor any specific religion but rather accommodates the general value of conscience. Congress has valid, neutral reasons for the distinction, including the profound administrative difficulty and potential for unfair or erratic application that would arise from trying to evaluate the sincerity and basis of objections to particular wars. These claims are often intertwined with political or sociological judgments, making consistent evaluation nearly impossible. The law also does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, as the incidental burden on those with selective objections is justified by the substantial government interest in raising armies and maintaining a fair and efficient conscription system.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Douglas
Yes. The statutory exemption, by distinguishing between objectors to all war and objectors to a particular war, creates an unconstitutional and invidious discrimination in violation of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The First Amendment protects freedom of conscience, which is the bedrock of both free speech and religion. To compel a person to kill against their conscience is a profound infringement of that right. The law as written favors traditional religious pacifists over others whose conscience, whether derived from religion, humanism, or moral philosophy, leads them to oppose a specific unjust war. This classification is not neutral and violates the principle that government cannot favor one set of religious or conscientious beliefs over another.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Douglas
Yes. The law unconstitutionally forces Louis Negre to choose between the commands of his Catholic faith and his legal duties as a soldier. Negre's objection is based on the well-established Catholic doctrine of 'just' and 'unjust' wars, which requires a believer to make a personal, conscientious decision about the morality of a particular conflict and to refuse participation in an unjust one. By denying an exemption to those whose religious beliefs mandate such a distinction, the statute directly burdens the free exercise of his religion. Forcing a devout Catholic to violate the imperatives of his conscience in this manner is a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrowed the legal pathway for individuals seeking conscientious objector status, affirming that the exemption is reserved for total pacifists. The Court's reasoning established a key precedent that accommodating religious beliefs through legislative exemptions is permissible under the Establishment Clause as long as there is a neutral, secular justification, such as administrative fairness and feasibility. The ruling demonstrates a high degree of judicial deference to Congress's power to raise and support armies, even when it creates an incidental burden on the free exercise of religion for those with selective, religiously-motivated objections. It effectively closed the door on using the 'just war' doctrine as a legal basis for avoiding conscription in a specific conflict.
