Gill v. Whitford
585 U. S. ____ (2018) (2018)
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Rule of Law:
To establish Article III standing to challenge a partisan gerrymander on a vote dilution theory, a plaintiff must prove a concrete and particularized injury by demonstrating that they live in a legislative district that was intentionally 'packed' or 'cracked' to dilute their individual vote.
Facts:
- Under the Wisconsin Constitution, the state legislature is required to redraw legislative district boundaries after each decennial census.
- Following the 2010 census, the Republican-controlled Wisconsin Legislature passed a new state legislative districting plan, known as Act 43, which was signed into law by the Republican governor in 2011.
- Twelve Wisconsin voters who identified as supporters of the Democratic Party alleged that Act 43 was an intentional partisan gerrymander.
- The voters claimed the plan worked by 'packing' Democratic voters into a few districts they would win by overwhelming margins and 'cracking' Democratic voters across many other districts to prevent them from forming majorities.
- In the 2012 State Assembly election, Republican candidates won 60 of the 99 seats while receiving only 48.6% of the statewide two-party vote.
- In the 2014 State Assembly election, Republican candidates won 63 seats after receiving 52% of the statewide vote.
Procedural Posture:
- Twelve Democratic voters (Whitford et al.) sued members of the Wisconsin state election commission (Gill et al.) in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, a federal court of first instance.
- The complaint alleged that Wisconsin's 2011 state legislative map, Act 43, was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.
- The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a statewide challenge.
- A three-judge District Court panel denied the defendants' motion to dismiss.
- After a bench trial, the District Court found Act 43 to be an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
- The District Court enjoined the defendants from using the Act 43 map in future elections.
- The defendants (Gill et al.) filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a group of voters have Article III standing to challenge a statewide legislative map as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander by alleging a statewide injury to their party's electoral success, without providing evidence that their individual votes were diluted in their specific districts?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Roberts
No. A plaintiff challenging a partisan gerrymander based on vote dilution does not have standing by asserting only a generalized, statewide grievance about their political party's diminished electoral prospects; they must demonstrate a particularized injury to their own vote, which is a harm specific to their individual district. The right to vote is individual and personal, so the injury of vote dilution through 'packing' or 'cracking' must be proven on a district-specific basis. A voter who does not live in a gerrymandered district has only an abstract grievance, insufficient for Article III standing. The plaintiffs' evidence, including testimony about achieving a party majority and statewide partisan-asymmetry metrics like the 'efficiency gap,' focused on group political interests rather than the required individual, legally protected interest. Because the plaintiffs failed to present evidence that their individual votes in their particular districts were burdened, they did not establish injury in fact.
Concurring - Justice Kagan
Yes, I agree with the Court that for a vote dilution theory of harm, a plaintiff must prove they live in a packed or cracked district to establish standing. However, partisan gerrymandering can cause other harms, such as infringing on the First Amendment right of association of a political party and its members. A claim based on this associational harm would not be district-specific; it would be a statewide injury because the gerrymander weakens the party's ability to fundraise, recruit candidates, and organize across the state. Standing for such a claim would therefore be based on statewide evidence, not proof of individual vote dilution. Although the plaintiffs in this case did not sufficiently develop this associational theory, it remains a viable avenue for future challenges.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
Yes, I agree with the majority that the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate Article III standing. However, I disagree with the decision to remand the case to give the plaintiffs another opportunity to prove their standing. The plaintiffs had a full trial to present their evidence and failed to meet the long-established requirements for standing. The ordinary practice when a plaintiff lacks standing is to remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the Court should have followed that practice here.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reshaped the litigation landscape for partisan gerrymandering by sidestepping the substantive question of whether such claims are justiciable and instead establishing a stringent, individualized standing requirement. The Court clarified that the cognizable legal injury is personal vote dilution, not a collective political harm to a party, forcing future litigants to structure their cases around district-specific evidence. This makes bringing a statewide challenge more complex, as it requires joining plaintiffs from numerous, specific packed and cracked districts. Justice Kagan's concurrence, however, preserved a potential future path for a statewide challenge based on a First Amendment associational harm theory, leaving the door open for a different kind of gerrymandering lawsuit.
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