Ghere v. Industrial Commission
278 Ill.App.3d 840, 663 N.E.2d 1046, 215 Ill. Dec. 532 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
An Industrial Commission's factual determination of whether a workplace injury arose out of and in the course of employment will not be set aside on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, meaning an opposite conclusion is clearly evident from the record.
Facts:
- Jim Ghere, age 63, worked for Howell Asphalt as a flagman on a highway paving project.
- On August 20, 1990, Ghere returned to work for the first time after a three-month absence following prostate surgery.
- On August 22, 1990, his third day back, Ghere was tasked with walking about 150 feet ahead of a paving machine to direct traffic.
- Ghere had no known history of heart problems and did not complain of any chest pains on the day he died.
- Coworkers testified that the temperature was in the mid-80s and humid, with the hot asphalt adding 80-100 degrees to the air temperature.
- A supervisor testified the temperature was 70-75 degrees and that Ghere was too far from the paver to feel heat from the asphalt; official weather records showed a high of 78 degrees.
- At approximately 10:30 a.m., Ghere collapsed after getting a drink of water and could not be revived.
- The death certificate indicated Ghere died from a heart attack, and medical experts for the claimant and employer offered conflicting opinions as to whether his work environment precipitated the event.
Procedural Posture:
- Elsie Ghere (claimant), the decedent's widow, filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits against Howell Asphalt (employer).
- An arbitrator for the Industrial Commission heard the case and found that the claimant failed to prove the death arose out of and in the course of employment.
- The Industrial Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision.
- The claimant appealed to the circuit court of Douglas County, which is a trial court.
- The circuit court confirmed the Industrial Commission's decision.
- The claimant, as appellant, appealed the circuit court's judgment to the appellate court.
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Issue:
Is the Industrial Commission's finding that the decedent's fatal heart attack did not arise out of and in the course of his employment against the manifest weight of the evidence when there was conflicting testimony regarding the work conditions and medical causation?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Colwell
No. The Commission’s finding that the decedent's death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. It is the province of the Commission to resolve conflicts in evidence, assess witness credibility, and determine the weight to be given to testimony. Here, the Commission was presented with conflicting evidence regarding the temperature, the effect of the asphalt's heat, and the medical cause of death. The Commission was entitled to credit the testimony of the employer's supervisor and medical expert, along with the official weather reports, over the testimony of the claimant's witnesses. Because there was sufficient factual evidence in the record to support the Commission’s decision, it cannot be overturned, even if another tribunal might have reached a different conclusion.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the highly deferential 'manifest weight of the evidence' standard of review for factual findings made by administrative agencies like the Illinois Industrial Commission. It underscores that an appellate court will not re-weigh conflicting evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder. As long as there is some credible evidence in the record to support the agency's conclusion, it will be upheld. The case also provides a key procedural clarification, holding that the statutory requirement to disclose medical opinions to the opposing party 48 hours before a hearing applies to treating physicians, not just examining physicians, to prevent 'trial by ambush.'
