Getchell v. Lodge
65 P.3d 50 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
A driver's violation of a traffic statute, which ordinarily constitutes negligence per se, may be legally excused if the driver proves by a preponderance of the evidence that they were confronted with a sudden emergency not caused by their own misconduct. Whether an emergency existed and whether the driver's actions were reasonable are questions of fact for the jury.
Facts:
- On the morning of January 16, 1998, Barbara Lodge was driving northbound on the Kenai Spur Highway, which was covered in a thin layer of ice.
- Lodge was driving approximately forty-five miles per hour in a fifty-five mile per hour zone due to the dark and icy conditions.
- A moose suddenly emerged from the darkness and entered Lodge's lane of traffic.
- Lodge braked hard to avoid hitting the moose, which caused her car to immediately skid and rotate in a counter-clockwise direction.
- Lodge lost control of her car as it skidded across the center line and came to a stop in the southbound lane.
- Joyce Getchell, who was driving southbound, then collided with the passenger side of Lodge's stationary vehicle, resulting in injuries to Getchell.
Procedural Posture:
- Joyce Getchell filed a personal injury negligence lawsuit against Barbara Lodge in the Alaska Superior Court (trial court).
- Before trial, Getchell filed a motion to exclude portions of the investigating state trooper's deposition testimony, which the trial court denied.
- The case proceeded to a three-day jury trial.
- At the close of evidence, Getchell moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied.
- The jury returned a verdict finding that Lodge was not negligent.
- Getchell then moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and, alternatively, for a new trial.
- The superior court denied both of Getchell's post-trial motions and entered judgment in favor of Lodge.
- Getchell (appellant) appealed the denial of her motions and the admission of the trooper's testimony to the Alaska Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Did the trial court err in denying the plaintiff's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial where the defendant presented evidence of a sudden emergency (a moose in the road) to excuse her violation of a traffic statute by skidding into oncoming traffic?
Opinions:
Majority - Fabe, Chief Justice
No, the trial court did not err because a driver's violation of a traffic regulation can be legally excused by a sudden emergency, and sufficient evidence was presented for a reasonable jury to find that the defendant driver acted reasonably under the circumstances. Although violating a traffic law is typically negligence per se, the defendant bears the burden of proving an excuse. The court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288A, which recognizes an 'emergency not due to his own misconduct' as a valid excuse. Lodge presented evidence of such an emergency—the moose—and testified she did not intentionally steer into the oncoming lane. An expert testified that Lodge had only about 1.5 seconds to react. Because reasonable persons could differ as to whether Lodge's conduct was negligent or excused, the jury's verdict must be respected, and the trial court's denial of the JNOV and new trial motions was proper.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the validity of the 'sudden emergency' doctrine as a powerful defense against claims of negligence per se arising from traffic violations. It affirms that the existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of a defendant's reaction are quintessential questions of fact for the jury, limiting the power of judges to overturn verdicts where credible evidence supports the defense. The case also provides important guidance on evidentiary rules, sanctioning the use of 'hybrid' fact/expert testimony from investigating police officers who, due to their direct involvement, can offer opinions based on their expertise without formal designation, so long as there is no unfair prejudice to the opposing party.
