George Thomas FRANKLIN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. William DUNCAN, Warden, Respondent-Appellant
70 F.3d 75, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8806, 95 Daily Journal DAR 15431 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
A prosecutor's comments on a defendant's post-Miranda silence and an accompanying jury instruction that allows an 'adoptive admission' based on such silence constitute prejudicial error, violating the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, if they have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.
Facts:
- Susan Nason was murdered.
- In 1989, Sergeant Morse and Detective Cassandro arrested Franklin as part of their investigation into Nason's homicide.
- When told by detectives that they were investigating Nason's murder and wanted to ask him questions, Franklin's response was, 'Have you talked to my daughter?'
- Franklin's daughter, Eileen, visited him in jail in January of the year the trial was held.
- During the jail visit, Eileen accused Franklin of the murder, stating she was telling the truth because he taught her to, and that the truth would set him free.
- Franklin responded to Eileen's accusation by pointing to a sign that said, 'Notice. This station may be monitored,' rather than denying the accusation.
- Franklin later asked Eileen, 'Is there anything I can do for you?' and then, 'Will you come back and see me again?'
Procedural Posture:
- Franklin was convicted of murder in California state court.
- Franklin filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.
- The District Court granted Franklin's petition for writ of habeas corpus, as reported in Franklin v. Duncan, 884 F.Supp. 1435 (N.D.Cal.1995).
- Duncan (the state authority) appealed the District Court's grant of habeas corpus to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Did the prosecutor's closing arguments regarding Franklin's post-Miranda silence and the accompanying jury instruction on adoptive admissions violate Franklin's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, thereby warranting a grant of habeas corpus?
Opinions:
Majority - PER CURIAM
Yes, the prosecutor's closing arguments and the accompanying jury instruction on adoptive admissions violated Franklin's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, thereby warranting the grant of habeas corpus. The court affirmed the district court's grant of habeas corpus, adopting its analysis and conclusions. The court supplemented the district court's opinion by explicitly including the prejudicial prosecutor's closing argument and the verbatim jury instruction. The prosecutor extensively commented on Franklin's post-Miranda silence, including his initial response to detectives and his failure to deny his daughter's accusation of murder during a jail visit, portraying these as evidence of guilt. The prosecutor explicitly argued that an innocent person would deny such accusations 'loudly and clearly.' Concurrently, the jury instruction permitted the jury to consider a defendant's 'failure to make a denial, or made false, evasive or contradictory statements in the face of an accusation' as an 'admission that the accusation thus made was true.' The court concluded that these comments and the instruction, in the context of the specific facts of the case, had a 'substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict,' citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, and therefore Franklin's petition for habeas corpus was properly granted.
Analysis:
This case strongly reaffirms the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, particularly prohibiting the use of a defendant's post-Miranda silence as evidence of guilt. It clarifies that both prosecutorial comments and jury instructions that imply guilt from silence are unconstitutional. The decision highlights the judiciary's role in safeguarding fundamental rights even when there is substantial evidence of guilt, emphasizing that such constitutional errors are not harmless if they substantially influence the verdict. This ruling serves as a crucial reminder to prosecutors and trial courts about the strictures against undermining a defendant's right to remain silent, impacting how silence can and cannot be presented to a jury in future cases.
