George Matheis, Jr. v. CSL Plasma Inc
936 F.3d 171 (2019)
Rule of Law:
A plasma donation center is a "service establishment" and thus a place of public accommodation under Title III of the ADA. A public accommodation's safety policy creating a blanket exclusion of individuals with disabilities is unlawful unless it is based on actual risks supported by evidence, not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations.
Facts:
- George Matheis, a retired police officer, was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) after being involved in a deadly shooting incident in 2000.
- In 2016, Matheis began donating plasma at a CSL Plasma, Inc. facility for monetary compensation.
- Over an 11-month period, Matheis safely and successfully donated plasma approximately 90 times without incident.
- In October 2016, Matheis acquired a dog, Odin, who was subsequently trained as a service animal to help him manage his PTSD symptoms.
- When Matheis next visited the CSL facility, he brought Odin with him and informed CSL staff that Odin was his service animal for PTSD.
- A CSL manager informed Matheis that CSL policy did not permit service animals for anxiety and barred him from donating.
- Matheis offered to leave Odin in his car and donate without the animal present, but the manager rejected this offer.
- The manager stated that Matheis could not donate again until he provided a letter from a healthcare provider attesting that he could safely donate without his service animal.
Procedural Posture:
- Matheis sued CSL Plasma, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging discrimination under Title III of the ADA.
- CSL moved for summary judgment, arguing it was not a 'public accommodation' and, alternatively, that its policy was a legitimate safety rule.
- The District Court granted summary judgment to CSL.
- The District Court held that CSL was a public accommodation subject to the ADA, but found that its policy was a legitimate, non-discriminatory safety reason for refusing service.
- Matheis, the plaintiff, appealed the grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
- CSL, the defendant, cross-appealed the District Court's holding that it was a public accommodation.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
1. Is a commercial plasma donation center that compensates donors a "service establishment" and therefore a "place of public accommodation" subject to Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)? 2. Does a public accommodation's policy of barring all prospective donors who use a psychiatric service animal violate the ADA if the policy is not based on an individualized assessment or evidence of actual risk, but on a generalization that such use indicates the donor's condition is too severe for safe donation?
Opinions:
Majority - Ambro, Circuit Judge
1. Yes, a plasma donation center is a service establishment and therefore a public accommodation subject to the ADA. The court aligned with the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., defining a 'service establishment' by the ordinary meaning of its terms. CSL provides the public with the service of extracting plasma using its trained personnel and specialized equipment in exchange for something of economic value (money). The direction of monetary payment is not determinative; like banks or pawnshops, which are also service establishments, CSL engages in a commercial exchange of value with the public and is therefore covered by Title III. 2. Yes, CSL's policy of barring all donors who use a psychiatric service animal violates the ADA because it is not based on actual risks. Under the ADA, use of a service animal is a presumptively reasonable accommodation. A public accommodation may only impose a safety requirement that excludes disabled individuals if that requirement is 'based on actual risks and not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations,' per 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(b). CSL failed to meet its burden to justify its policy. Its only evidence was a conclusory declaration from its medical director which generalized that individuals using service animals for anxiety have 'severe anxiety' and pose a risk. This was deemed speculative and stereotypical, lacking any specific medical or scientific evidence to show that all such donors pose an actual risk, especially in light of Matheis's history of 90 safe donations.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies that commercial entities that pay the public for goods or bodily products, like plasma, are considered public accommodations under the ADA in the Third Circuit. It significantly reinforces the requirement that safety-based policies which have a discriminatory effect must be substantiated by concrete evidence of actual risk, not by generalizations or stereotypes about a person's disability. The ruling heightens the burden on businesses to justify blanket exclusionary rules, thereby protecting individuals with disabilities from categorical discrimination and promoting individualized assessments over broad assumptions.
