General Telephone Co. v. Falcon
(1982)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), a plaintiff alleging a specific discriminatory employment practice may not maintain a class action on behalf of individuals alleging different discriminatory practices without a specific showing that bridges the conceptual gap between the claims. An allegation of a general policy of discrimination is insufficient on its own to satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements for class certification.
Facts:
- Mariano S. Falcon, a Mexican-American, was hired by General Telephone Company of Southwest in July 1969.
- Falcon was promoted twice within his first year of employment.
- In October 1972, Falcon applied for a promotion to the position of field inspector.
- General Telephone Co. denied Falcon's application for the promotion.
- The field inspector position was subsequently granted to several white employees who had less seniority than Falcon.
- Falcon believed the company's promotion policy discriminated against Mexican-Americans as a class.
Procedural Posture:
- Mariano S. Falcon filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
- After receiving a right-to-sue letter, Falcon filed a Title VII class action lawsuit against General Telephone Co. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
- The District Court certified a class comprising both Mexican-American employees and unsuccessful Mexican-American job applicants.
- Following a trial, the District Court found for Falcon on his individual promotion discrimination claim but found for General Telephone Co. on the class's promotion claim.
- The District Court found for the class on the hiring discrimination claim.
- Both parties appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s class certification, applying its 'across-the-board' rule, which permits an employee complaining of one employment practice to represent others complaining of different practices.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the appropriateness of the class certification.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a named plaintiff's claim of discriminatory promotion practices under Title VII necessarily share sufficient commonality and typicality under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) to permit him to represent a class of individuals who were allegedly victims of discriminatory hiring practices?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
No. A class action may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) have been met. The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's 'across-the-board' rule, which presumed that a victim of any form of racial discrimination could represent a class of individuals complaining of any other form of racial discrimination by the same employer. There is a wide conceptual gap between an individual's claim of discriminatory promotion and a class's claim of discriminatory hiring. To bridge this gap, a plaintiff must do more than allege a general policy of discrimination; he must show a specific connection, such as a biased testing procedure used for both hiring and promotion or an entirely subjective decisionmaking process that affects both, to satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements. Falcon failed to make such a showing, presenting different types of evidence for his individual claim (intentional discrimination) and the class claim (disparate impact statistics), demonstrating the lack of a sufficient nexus.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Chief Justice Burger
No. While agreeing with the majority's legal reasoning for reversing the class certification, the case should not be remanded for further proceedings. The record clearly demonstrates that no class should have been certified because there are no common questions of law or fact between Falcon's individual promotion claim and the class's hiring claim. Falcon's claim is one of disparate treatment, requiring proof of intent, while the class claim is one of disparate impact, resting on statistical analysis. The evidence presented actually negated the class hiring claim. Therefore, to promote judicial economy, the Court should simply reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss the class claim entirely.
Analysis:
This decision significantly curtailed the use of broad, 'across-the-board' class actions in Title VII employment discrimination litigation. By rejecting the presumption that any victim of discrimination can represent all victims of discrimination by the same employer, the Court heightened the standard for class certification. It mandates a 'rigorous analysis' of the Rule 23(a) requirements, forcing plaintiffs to affirmatively demonstrate the specific factual and legal nexus between their individual claims and the claims of the proposed class. This precedent makes it more difficult to certify classes that combine different types of alleged discrimination, such as hiring and promotion, requiring a more focused and evidence-based approach at the certification stage.
Gunnerbot
AI-powered case assistant
Loaded: General Telephone Co. v. Falcon (1982)
Try: "What was the holding?" or "Explain the dissent"