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General Motors Corp. v. Grizzle

Court of Appeals of Texas
642 S.W.2d 837, 1982 Tex. App. LEXIS 5402 (1982)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A bystander who does not witness the injury-producing event may nevertheless recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress if they arrive on the scene moments after the accident and have a contemporaneous sensory perception of the victim's suffering and the immediate aftermath.


Facts:

  • On February 3, 1979, Charles David Grizzle was driving a pickup truck with his daughter, Charlene Grizzle, and stepdaughter, Jaina Jeanette Wakefield, as passengers.
  • Donald Ray May, an employee of Chem-Jet, Inc., was driving a GMC vacuum truck on the same highway.
  • While attempting to slow down, May felt the GMC truck's rear brakes lock, causing him to lose control as the truck skidded into the oncoming lane.
  • Charles Grizzle's pickup truck crashed head-on into the Chem-Jet truck.
  • The collision killed Charles and Charlene Grizzle and severely injured Jaina Jeanette Wakefield.
  • Jane Patricia Grizzle, Jaina's mother, was traveling in a separate vehicle a few minutes behind the pickup truck.
  • Jane Grizzle arrived at the scene moments after the collision, before any emergency services, and witnessed the wrecked vehicles, saw her daughter's coat smashed against the truck window, and heard her daughter screaming.

Procedural Posture:

  • Three separate lawsuits were filed and consolidated in the trial court: two negligence actions against Donald May and Chem-Jet, Inc., and a products liability action against General Motors Corporation (GMC).
  • The plaintiffs were the mother, estate administrator, and another family member of the deceased, as well as the severely injured passenger.
  • Prior to trial, defendants Chem-Jet and May entered into a 'Mary Carter' settlement agreement with some of the plaintiffs.
  • The case was tried before a jury, which found that a design defect in the GMC truck's brake assembly was a producing cause of the accident.
  • The jury found that Donald May and Chem-Jet, Inc. were not negligent.
  • The jury awarded damages to the plaintiffs, including $40,000 to Jane Grizzle for mental anguish from witnessing her daughter's injury.
  • General Motors Corporation, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the intermediate court of appeals.

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Issue:

Does a plaintiff who arrives at the scene of an accident moments after it occurs and witnesses the immediate, horrifying aftermath, including the victim's suffering, satisfy the contemporaneous perception requirement for a bystander claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress?


Opinions:

Majority - Chase, Justice.

Yes. A plaintiff who arrives at the scene moments after an accident to witness its horrifying consequences can recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress because the shock results from a direct emotional impact from a contemporaneous perception of the accident's results. The court applied the three-factor test from Dillon v. Legg to determine foreseeability: (1) proximity to the scene, (2) shock resulting from contemporaneous perception, and (3) close relationship to the victim. The court reasoned that the 'contemporaneous perception' factor is not strictly limited to witnessing the impact itself. Instead, the trigger for mental anguish is the realization of the accident's consequences. Hearing the victim's screams and seeing the immediate aftermath brings a plaintiff 'so close to the reality of the accident as to render her experience an integral part of it,' satisfying the test.



Analysis:

This decision significantly clarifies and arguably expands the 'contemporaneous perception' element for bystander recovery claims in Texas. By shifting the focus from witnessing the negligent act itself to observing its immediate, horrifying consequences, the court lowered the doctrinal barrier for plaintiffs who arrive on an accident scene moments after impact. This precedent makes it easier for close family members who did not see the actual collision to bring a claim, provided their sensory perception of the aftermath was direct and immediate. The ruling emphasizes that the legally cognizable trauma comes from the realization of the harm to a loved one, which can occur seconds or minutes after the initial event.

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