General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
429 U.S. 125 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
An employer's disability benefits plan that excludes coverage for disabilities arising from pregnancy does not constitute gender-based discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Such a classification is not based on gender but rather distinguishes between pregnant persons and non-pregnant persons, a group which includes members of both sexes.
Facts:
- General Electric Co. (GE) provided its employees with a Weekly Sickness and Accident Insurance Plan that paid benefits to employees who became disabled from non-occupational sicknesses or accidents.
- The disability plan explicitly excluded coverage for any absence from work due to pregnancy.
- Several female employees at GE's Salem, Virginia plant became pregnant while employed by the company.
- These employees were absent from work due to their pregnancies and resulting childbirth.
- GE routinely denied their claims for disability benefits under the plan, citing the pregnancy exclusion policy.
Procedural Posture:
- Female employees of General Electric filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
- Respondents, on behalf of a class of women employees, sued General Electric Co. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging a violation of Title VII.
- The District Court, after a trial, held that GE's exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from its plan violated Title VII.
- GE (petitioner) appealed the District Court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment, finding that the plan constituted sex discrimination.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does an employer's disability benefits plan that excludes coverage for disabilities arising from pregnancy constitute sex-based discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rehnquist
No. An employer's disability benefits plan that excludes pregnancy-related disabilities is not sex discrimination under Title VII. The Court, relying heavily on its reasoning in Geduldig v. Aiello, held that the plan does not discriminate between men and women, but rather between pregnant women and non-pregnant persons, a group that includes both sexes. The plan provides the same coverage for identical risks to both men and women. There was no evidence that the exclusion of pregnancy was a pretext for invidious sex discrimination, or that the overall benefits package was worth more to men than to women. The Court also declined to give 'great deference' to a 1972 EEOC guideline that contradicted the agency's earlier positions and lacked support in the legislative history.
Concurring - Justice Stewart
No. The exclusion of benefits for disability during pregnancy is not a per se violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the respondents failed to prove that the plan had a discriminatory effect on women.
Concurring - Justice Blackmun
No. General Electric's exclusion of disability due to pregnancy is not a per se violation of Title VII, and the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving a discriminatory effect. However, this does not foreclose the possibility that discriminatory effect could be a controlling factor in a future Title VII case, and the principles of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. remain valid.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. A disability plan that compensates employees for all temporary disabilities except pregnancy, which affects exclusively women, is a prima facie violation of Title VII. The majority's reliance on Geduldig is misplaced because GE's policy was not the product of a gender-neutral risk assessment, but rather stemmed from a history of discriminatory attitudes toward women, as found by the District Court. By insuring against male-specific risks like prostatectomies while excluding the most common female-specific disability, the plan has a clear discriminatory effect that violates the broad social objectives of Title VII.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. A rule that places the risk of absence caused by pregnancy in a class by itself, by definition, discriminates on account of sex. The capacity to become pregnant is the primary biological characteristic that differentiates the female from the male. Therefore, a disability insurance plan that treats pregnancy differently from all other disabilities is plainly discriminatory on its face under the statute, without needing to analyze motive or effect.
Analysis:
This decision established a restrictive interpretation of 'sex discrimination' under Title VII, distinguishing it from classifications based on pregnancy. The Court's holding that pregnancy discrimination was not necessarily sex discrimination created a significant gap in employment protection for women. The ruling was highly controversial and prompted a swift and direct legislative response. In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which amended Title VII to explicitly state that discrimination 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, effectively overruling this decision.
